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Amtrak: The Failure of Passenger Preference and
Politics of Nonenforcement
David Konarske Jr*
America’s modern passenger rail system was born from a bargain between the federal government and the private railroad industry: The government would relieve the private railroads of their responsibility to provide passenger rail services, and in exchange, those companies would
give preference to passenger-carrying Amtrak trains on their tracks. This
was codified in federal statute. Yet, almost fifty years later, this preference is unenforced, Amtrak trains are routinely sidelined in favor of
freight trains, and Amtrak struggles with on-time performance and financial sustainability. Even modest improvements in the percentage of passenger trains arriving on time would result in substantial savings for
Amtrak and boost consumer confidence, yet since Amtrak’s creation, the
Department of Justice has filed only one enforcement action claiming violation of the corporation’s passenger-preference rights. This Article will
review the history of the Amtrak passenger preference and examine
Amtrak’s options, including DOJ enforcement, the recent shift to the Surface Transportation Board, and Amtrak’s request that Congress grant it
independent enforcement authority. Given the current ecosystem of federal litigating authority and Amtrak’s particular needs, the Article will
conclude that Congress should give Amtrak a private right of action to
enforce its passenger preference.
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INTRODUCTION
Amtrak excitement reached a high recently with the election of
“Amtrak Joe” Biden as President of the United States.1 President Biden

1. See Curtis Tate, Buttigieg, Transportation Secretary Nominee and ‘Second Biggest Passenger Rail Enthusiast’, TRAINS (Jan. 21, 2021), https://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2021/01/20buttigieg-transportation-secretary-nominee-and-second-biggest-passenger-rail-enthusiast-beginsconfirmation-process [https://perma.cc/N4BG-XCFP] (“‘I’m only the second biggest passenger
rail enthusiast in this particular administration,’ [Pete] Buttigieg [said], referring to President Joe
Biden, a longtime Amtrak rider.”); see also Simon Calder, Could Joe Biden Reverse Amtrak’s Railroad Disaster?, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 22, 2021, 3:22 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/
travel/news-and-advice/joe-biden-us-railroad-train-b1791268.html [https://perma.cc/RFD4-MYG
C] (noting President Biden’s popular nickname, “Amtrak Joe”).
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has signaled a significant commitment to expanding passenger rail,2
working with Congress to pass $66 billion in funding to massively expand Amtrak’s service, and update outdated and crumbling passengerrail infrastructure.3 The Biden administration and the framers of the
Green New Deal have recognized that passenger rail will take cars off the
road and reduce carbon emissions.4 Furthermore, because the transportation sector makes up the largest source of American carbon emissions,
doing passenger rail right will go a long way toward fighting climate
change.5 This will also ease congestion and enhance transportation opportunities as a growing number of people forego car ownership and take
advantage of newly emerging transportation modes.6
However, Amtrak, the nation’s intercity passenger-rail provider, has
suffered from numerous issues over the years.7 Amtrak has lost money
every year since its establishment, requiring congressional appropriations
2. See, e.g., The Biden Plan to Build a Modern, Sustainable Infrastructure and an Equitable
Clean Energy Future, BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT, https://joebiden.com/clean-energy/
[https://perma.cc/3RLP-5BML] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (mentioning Amtrak specifically as a
part of a “second great railroad revolution” of freight and passenger transportation).
3. Deon J. Hampton, Amtrak CEO Outlines Plans for Spending $66 Billion from Infrastructure
Funding, NBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2021, 11:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/amtrak-ceo-outlines-plans-spending-66-billion-infrastructure-funding-rcna4786
[https://perma.cc/K2EZ-HUFN].
4. See id. (noting Amtrak expansion would help combat climate change); Umair Irfan, America’s Trains Are a Drag. The Green New Deal Wants to Fix That., VOX (Feb. 13, 2019, 3:22 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2019/2/8/18215774/green-new-deal-high-speed-train-air-travel
[https://perma.cc/SL8U-HYXG] (describing passenger rail’s contribution to the Green New Deal);
see also Josh Glasser, America’s High-Speed Rail Off to a Slow Start, FORTUNE (Aug. 6, 2009,
10:23 AM), https://archive.fortune.com/2009/08/05/news/obama_high_speed_rail.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2009080609 [https://perma.cc/N4V2-EY4C] (describing Obama Administration’s efforts to promote passenger and high-speed rail).
5. See Irfan, supra note 4 (explaining that increase in demand for air transportation has helped
fuel United States’ rise in carbon emissions and alternatives to flying look to be better for the environment at present); see also Andreas Hoffrichter, Rail Travel Is Cleaner Than Driving or Flying,
but Will Americans Buy In?, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 1, 2019, 6:38 AM), https://theconversation.com/rail-travel-is-cleaner-than-driving-or-flying-but-will-americans-buy-in-112128
[https://perma.cc/C4V4-WD5K] (describing advancements in passenger-rail technology and how
Europe and Japan are taking advantage of them).
6. See Christopher R. Boll, Ride Sharing Is Already Reducing Car Ownership and Public Transportation Usage, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2018/02/ride-sharing-is-already-reducing-car-ownership-and [https://perma.cc/LX5UAUEE] (describing decreasing rate of car ownership and increasing usage of ride-sharing apps).
7. See Joseph Guzman, Newly Minted Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg Wants US to
Lead World in High-Speed Rail, THE HILL (Feb 5, 2021), https://thehill.com/changing-america/sustainability/infrastructure/537571-newly-minted-transportation-secretary-pete
[https://perma.cc/GGL2-RTJG] (“We’ve been asked to settle for less in this country, and I just
don’t know why people in other countries ought to have better train service . . . than Americans
do.”); see also, e.g., Bill Laitner, Amtrak Blames Freight Trains for Passenger Delays Getting
Worse, DET. FREE PRESS (Feb 24, 2020, 11:06 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/
local/michigan/oakland/2020/02/24/amtrak-blames-freight-trains-passenger-delays-gettingworse/4851468002 [https://perma.cc/T28N-BUFL] (highlighting Amtrak’s notorious on-time record based on 2019 data).
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to cover operating and maintenance expenses.8 Amtrak’s operating losses
alone totaled $29.8 million in 2019 and $170.6 million in 2018 despite
carrying record numbers of passengers.9 The railroad’s combined capital
and operating subsidies totaled nearly $1.9 billion in the year 2019.10 Further, Amtrak has well-known struggles keeping the trains running on
time.11 Amtrak’s chronic lateness is widespread: thirty-four out of fortytwo Amtrak services failed to meet the statutory minimum of eighty percent on time, and many even failed to exceed an on-time percentage of
forty percent.12 The lack of cooperation from the freight railroads hosting
the service makes any improvement unlikely.13 These conditions have resulted in a severely degraded passenger rail service.14 More importantly,
however, Amtrak’s operating conditions leave it with little credibility and
deficient equipment and infrastructure.15
To serve the public interest and grow to fit its purpose, Amtrak needs
help. It must be given some way to enforce its statutory right to preferred
track usage to improve its trip times.16 Although standards and
8. See DAVID C. NICE, AMTRAK: THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF A NATIONAL RAILROAD 17–
26 (1998) (illustrating Amtrak’s history of losses).
9. Luz Lazo, Amtrak Touts Record Ridership, Revenue for Fiscal 2019, WASH. POST (Nov. 8,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2019/11/08/amtrak-touts-record-ridership
-revenue-fiscal/ [https://perma.cc/N9FS-9D4K] (describing Amtrak’s revenues and ridership in
2019 and 2018). Amtrak was seeking to run an operating profit in 2020 until the coronavirus pandemic began in the United States. Id.; Rachel Sandler, Amtrak CEO Pleads for Federal Funding as
COVID-19 Decimates Ridership, FORBES (Oct. 21, 2020, 1:19 PM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/rachelsandler/2020/10/21/amtrak-ceo-pleads-for-federal-funding-as-covid-decimates-ridership/?sh=7a2a06682da2 [https://perma.cc/P9DP-MY2A] (explaining how coronavirus
pandemic has impacted Amtrak’s financial position).
10. Lazo, supra note 9.
11. See Laitner, supra note 7 (describing on-time record of Amtrak’s routes).
12. AMTRAK, AMTRAK HOST RAILROAD REPORT CARD 2019, at 2 (2019) [hereinafter HOST
RAILROAD REPORT CARD] https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/corporate/HostRailroadReports/Amtrak-2019-Host-Railroad-Report-CardFAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPE3-WB7A] (evaluating on-time performance for each of Amtrak’s
routes).
13. See id. at 3–4 (describing relationship between Amtrak and railroads whose track passenger
trains run on).
14. See, e.g., David Peter Alan, Amtrak’s Traditional Dining Service Disappearing, RY. AGE
(Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.railwayage.com/passenger/amtraks-disappearing-dining-cars/
[https://perma.cc/2HJ2-DFRC] (noting the once popular dining car train service is slowly being
replaced or eliminated all together).
15. See Amtrak State of Good Repair Backlog Tops $33.3 Billion, R.R. TRACK & STRUCTURES
(Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.rtands.com/passenger/intercity/amtrak-sogr-backlog-tops-33-3-billion
[https://perma.cc/3P2Z-WKZL] (describing deficient condition of Amtrak’s infrastructure); see
also AMTRAK, AMTRAK FIVE YEAR EQUIPMENT ASSET LINE PLAN 3 (2018),
https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/corporate/businessplanning/Amtrak-Equipment-Asset-Line-Plan-FY20-24.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EBE-WQTV]
(describing Amtrak’s aging locomotive and railcar fleets); see also NICE, supra note 8, at 15 (explaining Amtrak’s inability to gain credibility with public).
16. See FED. R.R. ADMIN., CR-2008-076, ROOT CAUSES OF AMTRAK DELAYS, at ii-v (2008)
(describing role that freight railroads play in Amtrak delays and Amtrak’s problems enforcing its
preference rights).
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enforcement by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) were both mandated by the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act in 2008,17
providing Amtrak a private right of action is the best alternative.18 Without the ability to prioritize its usage of the tracks over that of freight trains,
passenger trains are left waiting for slower freight trains.19
Part I will discuss the history and current state of Amtrak and the passenger preference, including why it has gone unenforced since 1973.20
Part II will consider enforcement decision-making at the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and in agencies like the STB.21 Part III will examine the
independent litigation authority that is normally given to agencies to
solve DOJ nonenforcement problems to determine whether it would apply here.22 Part IV will argue that Congress should grant Amtrak a private
right of action to enforce its preference.23
II. TRACK BULLETIN: THE STATE OF AMTRAK’S PASSENGER PREFERENCE
Congress created Amtrak in 1970 to take over intercity passenger-rail
service from the ailing private railroad industry.24 After years of financial
losses on passenger services, railroads were allowed to shed their

17. Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-432, §§ 207–09, 122
Stat. 4907, 4916–18 (requiring Federal Railroad Administration and Amtrak to set standards and
metrics to measure performance and service quality of its trains); see Metrics and Minimum Standards for Intercity Passenger Rail Services, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,971, 73,000–02 (Nov. 16, 2020) (describing finalized metrics and minimum standards for performance measurement). The final rules
are set forth at 49 C.F.R. §§ 273.1–273.11 (2020).
18. See discussion infra Part IV (asserting that Congress needs to adopt this alternative and
laying out supporting rationale).
19. See discussion infra Section I.A (describing DOJ’s historical failures to enforce Amtrak’s
right of way and its impact on Amtrak’s on-time performance).
20. See discussion infra Part I (exploring Amtrak’s history, origins of its passenger preference,
and current systemic issues).
21. See discussion infra Part II (reviewing politics within decision-making process of DOJ and
agencies).
22. See discussion infra Part III (explaining when Congress grants independent litigating authority and why it does so).
23. See discussion infra Part IV.
24. BEN GOLDMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45942, ISSUES IN THE REAUTHORIZATION OF
AMTRAK 1 (2021), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2021-01-05_R45942_e480db33b2ccf54
fac85ba22587c82cc8b886a01.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KFH-ZD7R] (describing Amtrak’s initial formation under Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970).

588

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 53

common-carrier25 obligation to provide intercity passenger service.26 In
exchange, the railroads were obligated only to donate their passenger
equipment to the endeavor and provide Amtrak’s trains access to their
rail lines.27 Through this process, the railroads could avoid the lengthy
abandonment procedures required by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and retain absolute control over the underlying rail infrastructure.28 This compromise would be expanded a few years later to include
preference rights for Amtrak trains on private rails—the very same preference rights at issue to this day.29 The bleeding of these historical factors
into Amtrak’s present-day circumstances necessitates an examination of
both periods.30
A. Outbound Train: Government Undertaking Passenger Rail;
Amtrak’s Founding Era
By the time Amtrak was formed in the 1970s, the railroad industry had
25. A common carrier is a company that
holds [itself] out to the public as engaged in the business of transportation of persons or
property from place to place for compensation, offering [its] services to the public generally. The distinctive characteristic of a common carrier is that [it] undertakes to carry
for all people indifferently, and hence is regarded in some respects as a public servant.
Kieronski v. Wyandotte Terminal R.R. Co., 806 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Kelly v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 110 F. Supp. 4, 6 (E.D. Pa. 1953)). A common carrier is required to provide members of the public “transportation or service upon reasonable request.” GS Roofing Prods. Co. v.
Surface Transp. Bd., 143 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 11101(a)). This duty
holds railroads to “a higher standard of responsibility” than other businesses such that they cannot
decline to provide services that are merely inconvenient or unprofitable. Id. (quoting Gen. Foods
Corp. v. Baker, 451 F. Supp. 873, 875 (D. Md. 1978)). This is because the history of railroads in
the United States makes them “quasi-public” in nature. Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co.,
431 F. Supp. 740, 742–43 (D. Vt. 1977). See 49 U.S.C. § 11101 (explaining statutory duties of a
common-carrier railroad). See generally CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42512, PASSENGER TRAIN ACCESS
TO
FREIGHT RAILROAD TRACK 2–6 (2012), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/
20120502_R42512_f4b70271c4824b20cce53d174112e2d7ff4b8163.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF66KUT4] for more information in this area.
26. See Charles A. Spitulnik & Jamie Palter Rennert, Use of Freight Rail Lines for Commuter
Operations: Public Interest, Private Property, 26 TRANSP. L.J. 319, 321–25 (1999) (describing
private railroads’ common-carrier obligations and conditions of Amtrak’s formation in context of
those obligations and mounting financial losses).
27. See id. at 323 (documenting Congress’s passage of Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 that
addressed railroads’ unwillingness or inability to operate passenger services).
28. See id. at 323–25; Bradon J. Smith, Comment, Changing Signals: A New Approach to the
Enforcement of Rail Passenger Traffic Preference in Response to the Passenger Rail Investment
and Improvement Act of 2008, 38 J. CORP. L. 441, 447–48 (2013) (describing circumstances behind
“break up” of passenger and freight services).
29. See FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 43 (“[T]he preference concept and the ability of
the freight carriers to appeal to the Secretary [of Transportation] to address preference concerns
was added by Congress in 1973, evidently in response to issues Amtrak faced in the first years of
operations.”); 49 U.S.C. §§ 24308(c), (f)(2) (providing Amtrak’s statutory preference over freight
traffic and for standards by which to judge freight railroads’ honoring of that performance).
30. See infra Sections I.A, B (examining Amtrak’s founding period and the historical and present circumstances of its preference rights, respectively).
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been going through trying times for decades.31 The rapidly changing
landscape in American transportation led to marketplace upheaval and
countless railroad bankruptcies.32 Railroads began abandoning their passenger services whenever they could convince the ICC to allow a route’s
discontinuance.33 The railroads became so eager to ditch passenger rail
that they sabotaged the comfort and reliability of their own passenger services to discourage use, hoping to make a case to discontinue services
based on the resulting passenger exodus.34 These circumstances left U.S.
passenger rail on its last legs and made clear the railroad’s hostility to the
service by the time of Amtrak’s formation.35
When it created Amtrak, Congress recognized that continuing intercity
passenger service was in the public interest.36 In fact, Congress continues
to recognize that Amtrak can help relieve traffic congestion, pollution,
and fuel consumption.37 However, Congress also recognized that the railroads, too, were gaining significant benefits from the arrangement and
were highly unlikely to ever resume providing passenger service again.38
As a result, the railroads were required to contribute money, equipment,
and access to trackage in the bargain.39 Furthermore, Amtrak was given
the right to rail access for possible expansion in the future, so long as it
came to an agreement with the host railroad or provided it with “just and
reasonable” compensation.40 Balancing the costs and the benefits, the
bargain seemed fair enough to both sides and was soon signed into law.41
Passenger preference was eventually added, giving Amtrak’s passenger
trains the right to preferred access to the tracks and to sideline freight
31. See DONALD M. ITZKOFF, OFF THE TRACK 21, 28–29 (1985) (describing passenger rail’s
collapsing market share alongside mainstreaming of automobile and airline travel in United States).
32. See NICE, supra note 8, at 3–4 (noting that technological improvement to air transport and
governmental spending focused on road travel showed rail travel as obsolete).
33. See ITZKOFF, supra note 31, at 79, 86–87 (describing rash of discontinuance petitions submitted to ICC).
34. See id. at 82–85 (explaining measures railroads took to self-sabotage, including reducing
responsiveness to customers; stopping advertising and travel agents’ commissions; neglecting facilities and equipment; and making passenger trains inconvenient by rescheduling them, causing
delays, and splitting them into multiple connections).
35. See Spitulnik & Rennert, supra note 26, at 323 (explaining that only federal intervention
saved passenger rail from complete dissolution).
36. See id. (explaining that Congress was concerned about losing passenger rail while grappling
with congested airports and highways).
37. See 49 U.S.C. § 24101(a) (describing why Amtrak’s existence is in the “[p]ublic convenience and necessity” of United States).
38. See Spitulnik & Rennert, supra note 26, at 324–25 (describing benefits to private railroads).
39. See id. at 324 (describing payments and trackage access provided at Amtrak’s founding);
Smith, supra note 28, at 447–48 (describing contributions of equipment to Amtrak’s founding
fleet).
40. Spitulnik & Rennert, supra note 26, at 324–25 (outlining ICC’s determination that “just and
reasonable” compensation “can not be greater than ‘the incremental costs’ of Amtrak’s use of the
railroad’s facilities”).
41. See id. at 325 (“This, to Congress and the railroads at the time, as well, was a fair trade.”).
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trains in its way.42 Amtrak, however, was not given the ability to directly
enforce their new right.43
To implement this compromise, Congress created a government corporation legally known as the National Railroad Passenger Corporation—doing business as Amtrak.44 Thus, Amtrak is structured and operated as a private, for-profit corporation whose board of directors is
appointed by the president of the United States and confirmed by the
United States Senate.45 Congress uses this system, here and elsewhere,
due to the perception that corporations are more efficient than government and more effective at providing consumer goods and services.46
Further, it is seen as a way to discipline government via the free market
and protect from political interference the organization’s pursuit of the
public interest.47 Further, Amtrak cannot participate in regulating the
freight railroads48 and can generally represent itself in the courts.49 Thus,
the stage was set for Amtrak’s operation and continued sputtering along
into the present day.50
B. Waiting for a Light: Amtrak’s Long Wait for Its Preferred Track

42. See 49 U.S.C. § 24308 (governing Amtrak’s access to private rail infrastructure, including
the passenger preference).
43. See 49 U.S.C. § 24103(a)(1) (“[O]nly the Attorney General may bring a civil action for
equitable relief in a district court of the United States when Amtrak or a rail carrier [violates or
threatens to violate this part.]”).
44. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 1 (“Amtrak—legally the National Railroad Passenger Corporation—was created by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970[, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat.
1327,] and began operating in 1971 . . . .”); see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 24301, 24302 (establishing
Amtrak as a government-controlled corporation).
45. §§ 24301, 24302.
46. See A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 UNIV. ILL. L.
REV. 543, 578–79 (discussing comparative advantage of using corporate form, particularly where
program to be implemented is primarily commercial, potentially self-sustaining, and involves many
commercial transactions with general public).
47. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 841,
888–89 (2014) (explaining that there may be additional efficiencies to corporate form coming from
“market pressure or other factors,” including ability to shield organization from special-interest
lobbying and influence).
48. Compare Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 31–34 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(holding that Amtrak was self-interested and, thus, could not regulate other participants in railroad
industry), with Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394 (1995) (holding that
Amtrak is a government actor for constitutional purposes).
49. See, e.g., Am. Premier Underwriters v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 709 F.3d 584, 585 (6th
Cir. 2013) (exemplifying Amtrak’s ability to represent itself in court); VBR Tours, LLC v. Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 14-cv-00804, 2015 WL 5693735 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2015) (illustrating
Amtrak representing itself as a party in a court).
50. See Matthew Yglesias, Amtrak Turns 45 Today. Here’s Why American Passenger Trains
Are So Bad., VOX (May 1, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/5/1/11539966/amtrak-45anniversary [https://perma.cc/25Z3-6TAB] (“The second question . . . is why passenger rail outside
of the Northeast Corridor is so unimaginably awful.”); see also Guzman, supra note 7 (“We’ve
been asked to settle for less in this country . . . .”).
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Usage
Today’s Amtrak is considered anything but successful.51 Its services
often run late.52 It is unable to break even on costs, let alone make
money.53 And it lags far behind the passenger rail available in other developed nations.54 Despite record ridership numbers,55 there is consensus
that Amtrak’s performance needs significant improvement to meaningfully contribute to the American transportation ecosystem.56 In addressing these issues, we must examine: (1) the failure of Amtrak’s preference
rights and its impact on the railroad57 and (2) why recent steps taken to
correct the problem fall short of a solution.58
1. Continued Sabotage Through Denying Amtrak’s Preferred Track
Rights
Whether purposeful or not, the failure to enforce Amtrak’s track preference over freight traffic is a significant impediment to its operations.59
The lateness of Amtrak trains is well known to the general public, with
Amtrak posting deficient on-time records despite having a significantly
more generous standard than the airlines.60 In 2019, nineteen of twentyseven state-supported trains failed to meet an eighty percent on-time
standard; all fifteen long-distance trains failed to meet the standard as

51. See Yglesias, supra note 50 (“[P]assenger rail outside of the Northeast Corridor is so unimaginably awful.”).
52. See HOST RAILROAD REPORT CARD, supra note 12, at 2 (showing Amtrak’s abysmal ontime performance on most routes).
53. See Lazo, supra note 9 (reporting Amtrak operating losses of $29.8 million in 2019 and
$170.6 million in 2018).
54. See Yglesias, supra note 50 (explaining why Amtrak service is “so unimaginably awful” in
comparison to railroad systems in other countries such as France, Spain, China, and Japan).
55. See Lazo, supra note 9 (“Amtrak carried a record 32.5 million passengers in the 2019 fiscal
year with record growth on the Northeast Corridor and state supporter lines . . . .”).
56. See, e.g., Yglesias, supra note 50 (“It’s not just that [Amtrak] services aren’t the best in the
world and don’t deploy the most cutting-edge technology available. They are often truly abysmal,
with travel times worse than what was possible 100 years ago.”); Guzman, supra note 7 (“[T]he
nation needs to step it up as it lags behind Europe and China in rail safety and speed.”). See generally, e.g., Mike Pearl, Could “Amtrak Joe” Revolutionize Public Transport?, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb.
4,
2021),
https://newrepublic.com/article/161233/amtrak-joe-revolutionize-public-transport
[https://perma.cc/M4JD-QCWS].
57. See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
58. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
59. See generally OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L R.R. PASSENGER CORP., OIG-A-2020-001,
TRAIN OPERATIONS: BETTER ESTIMATES NEEDED OF THE FINANCIAL IMPACTS OF POOR ON-TIME
PERFORMANCE 3–4 (2019) [hereinafter OIG REPORT] https://amtrakoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/OIG-A-2020-001%20OTP%20mandate.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV6U-J55Q] (explaining pattern of nonenforcement of Amtrak’s preferred trackage rights and its impacts).
60. See Laitner, supra note 7 (“Across the country, Amtrak trains last year were on-time only
60% to 70% of the time . . . . In Michigan, the on-time rate was only 43%. . . . In air travel, a plane
is considered ‘late’ . . . if it arrives 15 minutes or more after its scheduled time. Amtrak stretches
that to 29 minutes.”).
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well.61 First, improving Amtrak’s on-time percentage by five percent on
each route would save the railroad $12.1 million in operating costs in the
first year.62 Next, improving Amtrak’s on-time percentage to seventy-five
percent would save Amtrak $41.9 million in operations costs annually
and $336 million in one-time capital expenditures.63 Finally, an improvement in system reliability will cause Amtrak to regain credibility and increase ridership.64
Amtrak has been very clear in communicating this problem to the
press, ridership, and freight railroads themselves.65 Because of freight
railroad dispatching practices and reductions in capacity, Amtrak is routinely sidelined in favor of slower freight trains.66 The dynamic has poisoned the railroad’s relationships with its host railroads, even causing arguments between lawyers about Twitter posts warning of train delays.67
61. HOST RAILROAD REPORT CARD, supra note 12, at 2. There is some data available for 2020,
but COVID-19 and a lack of 2020 report card prevents valid analysis. See Reports and Documents,
AMTRAK, https://www.amtrak.com/reports-documents [https://perma.cc/ZC97-ANJH] (last visited
Feb. 23, 2020) (hosting Amtrak’s monthly and annual reports on host railroad performance); see
also Sandler, supra note 9 (explaining the impact of COVID-19 on Amtrak’s ridership, finances,
and route schedule).
62. See OIG REPORT, supra note 59, at 5 (“This level of improvement would reduce operating
costs by about $8.2 million and increase ticket revenue by about $3.9 million.”).
63. Id. at 9. The on-time improvement produces these savings by reducing the number of oncall crew and crew bases needed, eliminating excess train equipment used to make up for systemic
delays, minimizing overtime and crew penalties caused by poor on-time performance, and selling
additional tickets by (1) opening up sales in areas currently not served and (2) increasing demand
due to service improvement. Id. at 8–14.
64. See id. at 6, 14 (explaining that improved performance will increase revenues through increased popularity and service expansions); see also, e.g., Laitner, supra note 7 (serving as an example of Amtrak’s poor reputation).
65. See, e.g., Laitner, supra note 7 (“Officials with [Amtrak] say that, if enough Americans
contact their Congress members – and Amtrak’s web site explains how to do that – that speedy
passenger trains could regain the historic priority they once wielded over creeping freight trains
. . . .”; OIG REPORT, supra note 59, at 1 (“On-time performance (OTP) of Amtrak’s . . . trains has
been a longstanding challenge for the company, which identifies poor OTP as a key factor driving
its annual operating loss . . . .”); Why Are Amtrak Trains Delayed by Freight Trains?, AMTRAK
NEWS, http://blog.amtrak.com/2019/05/why-are-amtrak-trains-delayed-by-freight-trains/ [https://
perma.cc/BFT7-WSNF] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (encouraging riders to call their congressperson
about the problem).
66. See FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–9 (explaining impacts of freight railroad dispatching practices on Amtrak delays). While some of these causes are unintentional, such as inexperienced dispatchers or track maintenance, many others—such as preserving “network fluidity”
and corporate cultures poisoned against Amtrak—are at least willful if not intentional. Id.
67. See Smith, supra note 28, at 449 (“Meanwhile, as Amtrak’s relationship to the federal government took on an obligatory quality, the service’s relationship with the new freight-only private
railroads was hardly peaceful.”); Letter from Garrett Urban, Gen. Att’y, Norfolk S. Corp., to William H. Herrmann, Senior Managing Deputy Gen. Counsel, Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Feb. 22,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/NorfolkSouthernLettertoAmtrak2019.
pdf?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/KGA9-A3GD] (demanding Amtrak remove Twitter
posts blaming Norfolk Southern for train delays and cease future posting); Letter from William H.
Herrmann, Senior Managing Deputy Gen. Counsel, Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., to Garrett Urban,
Gen.
Att’y,
Norfolk
S.
Corp.
(Mar.
6,
2019),
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Amtrak’s significant reliance on host railroads to operate most of its services makes this conflict existential for passenger rail, despite the beneficial role Amtrak plays by shouldering private railroads’ common-carrier duty to provide passenger service.68
Despite this raging conflict, the passenger preference codified in
Amtrak’s authorizing statute has remained largely dormant.69 Only the
DOJ can enforce the passenger preference in court.70 The DOJ initiated
one enforcement action to protect Amtrak’s rights in the 1979 case United
States v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,71 but even that case is unhelpful to any analysis because it settled before trial.72 Further, there is
some evidence that the prosecution was motivated by congressional interest.73 This nonenforcement has been so extensive that Amtrak stopped
collecting data on the cost impact of the delays because it demoralized
the agency.74 Because the DOJ has not enforced the law, Amtrak has requested independent litigating authority, and others have recommended
placing jurisdiction elsewhere in the Department of Transportation.75
2. A Possible Solution in the Surface Transportation Board?
Amtrak can, in theory, enforce its passenger preference through the
Surface Transportation Board.76 Sections 207 and 213 of the Passenger
https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/AmtrakResponsetoNorfolkSouthern2019.pdf?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/8YE5-NPJ8] (responding to Norfolk Southern
letter and refusing to remove posts).
68. See HOST RAILROAD REPORT CARD, supra note 12, at 3 (“Amtrak owns only 3% of the
21,400 route-miles traveled by Amtrak trains, primarily on the Northeast Corridor. The rest are
mostly owned by freight railroads.”); see also Smith, supra note 28, at 451 (“Amtrak ha[s] previously acted more as a convenience for the freight companies, carrying a burden they had previously
borne.”).
69. See FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–4 (noting that DOJ only brought an enforcement
action once in preference law’s entire history).
70. See 49 U.S.C. § 24103(a)(1) (vesting sole enforcement authority in Attorney General).
71. FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–4, 4 n.13.
72. Id. at 4 n.13. There is no judicial interpretation; thus, the railroads violate the law and claim
to merely “interpret it differently.” Id. at 3–4, 4 n.13.
73. See, e.g., Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1981:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Dep’t of Transp. & Related Agencies Appropriations of the
H. Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong. 656–57 (1980) (testimony on behalf of National Railroad
Passenger Corporation).
74. See OIG REPORT, supra note 59, at 15 (“Executives and managers told us they have not
updated the models because they do not think that the financial estimates alone are useful in improving OTP.”).
75. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 16 (“Amtrak has requested that a similar enforcement power
be granted statutorily to Amtrak, going so far as to recommend specific bill language that would
allow Amtrak to sue host railroads.”); FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 24 (“We recommend
that the FRA Administrator [s]eek a legislative change that would provide Amtrak with the same
right to appeal to the Secretary of Transportation to enforce its preference rights . . . [and s]eek a
legislative change to expand the personal liability [of] dispatchers . . . .”).
76. See Smith, supra note 28, at 450–51 (explaining new law’s effects, particularly sections 207
and 213, which created standards and enforcement of the preference right).
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Rail Reform and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA) require the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) to develop on-time standards for STB enforcement of the passenger preference.77 Thus, the STB should be able to
initiate an investigation on its own initiative or if it receives a request
from Amtrak.78 This would allow the STB to award Amtrak damages or
other appropriate relief when a freight railroad is at fault.79
However, PRIIA has been largely ineffective since its passage as sustained litigation and industry hostility has rendered it unenforceable.80
First, the freight railroads fought the rulemaking fiercely in its original
notice-and-comment period in 2010.81 Then, the railroads brought a constitutional claim that kept the law and its implementing regulations in
court for nearly a decade, stalling enforcement.82 As a result, the 2010
Metrics and Standards were vacated, and enforcement was delayed further while the FRA rewrote the rule and completed another round of notice and comment, causing Amtrak’s then-pending claims before the STB

77. Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-432, § 207, 122 Stat.
4848, 4916–17 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 24101); § 213(a), 122 Stat. at 4925–26 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 24308(f)(1)) (establishing passenger train performance standards).
78. See 49 U.S.C. § 24308)(f)(1):
If the on-time performance of any intercity passenger train averages less than 80 percent
for any 2 consecutive calendar quarters, or the service quality of intercity passenger train
operations for which minimum standards are established under section 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 fails to meet those standards for
2 consecutive calendar quarters, the [STB] may initiate an investigation[. U]pon the filing of a complaint by Amtrak, . . . the Board shall initiate such an investigation . . . .
The final rule sets the measurement of the on-time standard as “the percentage of all customers
. . . who arrive at their detraining point no later than 15 minutes after their published scheduled
arrival time, reported by train and by route.” 49 C.F.R. § 273.5(a)(1). This and other data, including
the number of “certified schedules” between the railroads, station-based performance, train delays
and running time, and other customer service and financial metrics, must be collected and reported.
§§ 273.5, 273.7, 273.9.
79. See §§ 24308(f)(2), (f)(3) (describing STB’s authority to award damages and other “reasonable and appropriate” relief upon a preference violation).
80. See, e.g., Metrics and Minimum Standards for Intercity Passenger Rail Service, 85 Fed. Reg.
72,971, 72,973 (“[T]he 2010 Metrics and Standards were subject to a legal challenge on the basis
that section 207 of PRIIA was unconstitutional. . . . As a result, in July 2019, FRA and Amtrak
once again began the process of developing [them].”).
81. See Smith, supra note 28, at 452–53 (describing extensive comments submitted by freight
railroad trade organization, Association of American Railroads (AAR)).
82. See id. at 454 (providing a basic explanation of AAR’s claims); see generally Dep’t of
Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 575 U.S. 43 (2015); Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. Dep’t of Transp., 896 F.3d
539 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Ass’n
of Am. R.R. v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated, 575 U.S. 43 (2015); Ass’n
of Am. R.R. v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 11-1499, 2017 WL 6209642 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2017), rev’d
896 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. Dep’t of Transp., 865 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C.
2012), rev’d 821 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Eventually, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit held that Amtrak’s role in the rulemaking would be limited since it is a “self-interested
party” that was tasked with regulating “competitors.” Ass’n of Am. R.R., 821 F.3d at 34–36.
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to be dismissed.83 The final rule was issued on November 16, 2020, despite continued bickering among Amtrak and other interested parties.84
The rule did take effect, however, and the established metrics began to
apply in July 2021.85
For its part, Amtrak remains pessimistic about its ability to improve
on-time performance without the authority to enforce its track preference
in court. Amtrak’s behavior makes this apparent upon even a cursory inspection. First, Amtrak has continued to push for litigating authority to
allow it to enforce passenger preference on its own, resulting in a bill
being introduced in 2019.86 Second, Amtrak stopped tracking the financial impact of substandard on-time performance, believing it to be a threat
to morale and ineffective at persuading stakeholders to cooperate.87 Finally, Amtrak has continued fighting freight railroads in the rulemaking
process, in court, in the press, and in federal reports.88 Thus, despite enforcement authority in the DOJ and STB, the issues with on-time
83. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 896 F.3d at 551 (vacating on-time standards and severing offending
clause from the PRIIA). See generally Metrics and Minimum Standards for Intercity Passenger Rail
Service, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,971, 72,971–73,002 (Nov. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 273)
(explaining breadth of interested states, railroads, and other parties consulted in rulemaking process
and addressing comments submitted to FRA); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.—Investigation of Substandard Performance of the Capitol Ltd., Docket No. NOR 42141, Dec. ID 46360 (S.T.B. Apr. 13,
2018), https://dcms-external.s3.amazonaws.com/MPD/62491/B823D813B68A924A8525826E00
4E40A2/46360.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTE3-RY7T] (dismissing Amtrak’s first-ever attempt to enforce its preference rights at the Surface Transportation Board without prejudice due to lack of ontime metrics); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.—Section 213 Investigation of Substandard Performance
on Rail Lines of Canadian National Railway Co., Docket No. NOR 42134, Dec. ID 46382 (S.T.B.
Apr. 13, 2018), https://dcms-external.s3.amazonaws.com/MPD/62491/0447EE574F2B03DF8525
826E004D8B39/46382.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YU6-SHJU] (dismissing Amtrak’s second attempt
to enforce its preference rights without prejudice).
84. See Metrics and Minimum Standards, 85 Fed. Reg. at 73,000–02 (issuing final rules on
passenger-preference metrics and standards); see, e.g., Jim Blaze, Amtrak vs. Freight Railroads:
Shippers, You Are Impacted!, RY. AGE (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.railwayage.com/regulatory/amtrak-vs-freight-railroads-shippers-you-are-impacted/?RAchannel=home
[https://perma.cc/E8PY-Y3BU] (attacking legislative attempts to buttress Amtrak’s preference
rights through additional legislation); Stephen Gardner, Amtrak’s Preference Rights Are Not New—
Or Reason For Alarm, RY. AGE (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.railwayage.com/passenger/intercity/amtraks-preference-rights-are-not-new-or-reason-for-alarm/ [https://perma.cc/2LLM-F3G8]
(responding to concerns levied on behalf of shippers regarding passenger-preference enforcement).
85. See Metrics and Minimum Standards, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72,971, 72,979, 73,001 (addressing
timeline for applying rules).
86. See GOLDMAN, supra note 24, at 16 (noting Amtrak’s repeated requests for independent
litigating authority); Rail Passenger Fairness Act, S. 2922, 116th Cong. (2019) (“A Bill [t]o permit
Amtrak to bring civil actions in Federal district court to enforce the right . . . [of] rail passenger
transportation preference over freight transportation in using a rail line . . . .”).
87. OIG REPORT, supra note 59, at 15.
88. See id. (discussing Amtrak’s efforts to persuade railroads to reduce delays for Amtrak
trains); FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–19 (describing freight railroads’ practices that contribute to Amtrak’s issues and railroads’ knowledge of them); Blaze, supra note 84 (discussing
Amtrak’s legislative efforts); Gardner, supra note 84 (responding to criticisms of Amtrak’s legislative efforts); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 575 U.S. 43, 45–46 (2015) (considering
railways’ challenge to Amtrak’s performance metrics and standards).
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performance that have long contributed to Amtrak’s stagnation are likely
far from over—continuing to cause financial and credibility losses for
U.S. intercity passenger rail.89
III. BLOCKED CROSSING: ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS IN THE DOJ AND
STB
Generally, there is no right to DOJ enforcement of federal law.90 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that an agency’s decision not to
prosecute a crime or regulatory violation is “committed to [its] absolute
discretion” and is beyond judicial review.91 An agency is expected to balance numerous factors when making enforcement decisions, using its expertise and accounting of its own resources to come to a proper conclusion.92 As a result, the Court recognizes that the decision to take
enforcement action is not adequately reviewable for judicial action.93 The
Court is even more hesitant to intervene where an agency decides not to
use its coercive powers, finding that addressing an agency’s lack of prosecutorial vigor is within the purview of Congress.94 Agency decisionmaking on whether to enforce a statute is of paramount importance to
policymakers and impacted members of the public.95 Thus, this note addresses the factors impacting enforcement decisions at the DOJ and STB,
respectively.96
89. See discussion supra Section I.B (describing Amtrak’s chronic performance issues).
90. See Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Mich. v. Ashcroft, 360
F. Supp. 2d 64, 68 n.5 (D.D.C. 2004) (first citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985),
then citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331–32 (1928)) (discussing administrative
prosecutorial discretion).
91. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 (“This Court has recognized on several occasions over many
years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”).
92. See id. at 831–32 (discussing considerations agencies weigh before deciding to enforce).
93. See id. at 831 (“This recognition of the existence of discretion is attributable in no small part
to the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement.”). An
agency is even able to decide to cease operating or enforcing a program should it determine that
the action contradicts the intention of Congress in the relevant provision’s passage. See Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848, 850–56 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (affirming discretion of Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development to discontinue accepting, processing, and approving applications for federal subsidies under three different housing programs).
94.
[W]e note that when an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive
power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon
areas that courts often are called upon to protect. Similarly, when an agency does act to
enforce, that action itself provides a focus for judicial review . . . . The danger that agencies may not carry out their delegated powers with sufficient vigor does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that courts are the most appropriate body to police this aspect of
their performance.
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832, 834.
95. See discussion supra Sections II.0, 0 (addressing different considerations impacting enforcement at DOJ and STB, respectively).
96. See id.

2022]

Amtrak: The Failure of Passenger Preference

597

A. Decision-Making at the Department of Justice
The DOJ has the same discretion as other federal agencies in deciding
whether to bring an enforcement action under a federal statute.97 This is
undeniably a political issue.98 Although this issue gained visibility in the
last fifteen years of partisan warfare,99 presidential administrations have
used nonenforcement to accomplish political priorities predating President Obama’s time in office.100 In fact, agency architects have been concerned about political patronage in enforcement decisions for some time;
in some cases, this has prompted the creation of independent agencies.101
This concern is well-placed; much of federal regulatory enforcement will
tend to disproportionately affect politically connected parties.102 Thus,
nonenforcement has clearly been recognized as a tool to reward political
97. See Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Mich. v. Ashcroft, 360
F. Supp. 2d 64, 68 n.5 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction preventing in
effect the Department of Justice from bringing an enforcement action is similarly an inappropriate
pre-enforcement action.”).
98. See, e.g., Keith Ridler, GOP Idaho Lawmakers Aim to Defund Party’s Attorney General,
ABC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2021, 12:19 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/gop-idaho-lawmakers-aim-defund-partys-attorney-general-76343273 [https://perma.cc/F8JF-P9VR] (explaining
Idaho legislature’s decision to defund their AG and decentralize litigating authority because AG
was attempting to “call balls and strikes” as opposed to taking political positions in litigation).
99. See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton & David L. Noll, How States Can Step In When Trump
Doesn’t Enforce Laws, POLITICO (June 18, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2019/06/18/forced-arbitration-trump-administration-000925/
[https://perma.cc/C9BY-ELFW] (“It’s no secret that the Trump administration wants to ‘deconstruct’ the administrative state, in part by refusing to enforce federal laws designed to protect workers and the environment.”); Steve Friess, Obama’s Policy Strategy: Ignore Laws, POLITICO (June
16, 2012, 7:02 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2012/06/obamas-policy-strategy-ignorelaws-077486 [https://perma.cc/8GFB-HE8Q] (“Rather than pushing new laws through a divided
Congress to enact his agenda, Obama is relying on federal agencies to ignore . . . laws that some of
his important supporters . . . don’t like.”).
100. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 280 (1993) (“The Bush and Reagan administrations, especially in challenging EPA authority to sue federal facilities, took issue with some
preexisting decentralization arrangements. These arrangements were challenged as improper limitations on executive branch policy coordination . . . .”); Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle
That Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 205, 217 (1998) (“[I]n response to the perceived failure of DOJ to represent [the] Federal
Trade Commission . . . adequately, Congress granted the FTC independent litigating authority
. . . .”).
101. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 95–96 (1994) (first
citing Fed. Election Reform, 1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections and
the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 93d Cong. 17, 177, 186 (1973); then citing Fed. Election Campaign Act of 1973: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Comm’ns of the S. Comm. on Com., 93d
Cong. 70–71 (1973)) (explaining Congress granted FEC independent status due to concerns that a
president might not enforce election laws against his own party).
102. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 774 (1999) (“Yet a considerable amount of legislative
activity potentially affects constituencies with real political clout (not to mention the legislators
themselves).”). “Powerful interest groups might indeed have important advantages when dealing
with . . . centralized rule making or even adjudicatory authority.” Id. at 779.
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constituencies or further policy priorities.103
However, there are nonpolitical concerns regarding nonenforcement of
federal law as well.104 For instance, some raise concerns that prosecutors
may use their discretion to bring claims that are not meritorious or should
not be resolved under a criminal statute if the law is too broad or vague.105
On the other end of the spectrum, prosecutorial discretion has also been
cited as a defense of the mechanical application of the law where the statute is vague and overbroad, or where the relevant conduct is not a substantial violation of the law.106 A third concern, however, lies in the middle: prosecutorial discretion can result in a lack of meritorious
enforcement of valid laws.107 Among these sometimes-theoretical and
sometimes-practical concerns, government attorneys are left to use their
discretion to prioritize the government’s allocation of prosecutorial resources.108
Because the executive branch has limited resources, the more relevant
consideration is whether the enforcement decision is faithful to congressional intent in passage of the law.109 It is true that the executive branch
will often decide not to enforce the law in order to promote its own policy
103. Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119, 1121–22
(2015) (“Officials in the Reagan and Bush Administrations reduced enforcement in key areas of
concern to their core constituents . . . . In several areas of core concern to his own constituents,
President Obama has continued this pattern . . . .”). There can also be seemingly random differences
in enforcement. See, e.g., R. Brent Wisner, Politics of Enforcement: How the Department of Justice
Enforces the Civil False Claims Act, 17 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 43, 58 (2012) (finding that Democrats pursue more cases against those defrauding the federal government than Republicans pursue).
104. See, e.g., Michael Kades, Exercising Discretion: A Case Study of Prosecutorial Discretion
in the Wisconsin Department of Justice, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 115, 115–116 (1997) (expressing concern that overzealous prosecutors could use vague laws to criminalize legal conduct or conduct best
handled through the civil law).
105. See, e.g., id. (“Some fear that overaggressive prosecutors will use broadly worded statutes
to turn ordinary, law-abiding citizens into criminals.”).
106. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 38
HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 159, 162–63 (2014) (discussing benefits of prosecutorial discretion when
mechanical application of criminal statutes would result in punishments not commensurate with
guilt).
107. See Kades, supra note 104, at 115–16 (describing concern that, because of prosecutorial
discretion, white-collar crime could be “a forgotten stepchild” that is “ignored and underprosecuted,
despite its threat”).
108. See id. at 117 (“In a world of limited resources, prosecutors must choose which violations
to pursue; not every violation leads to prosecution.”); see also J. Richard Broughton, Politics, Prosecutors, and the Presidency in the Shadows of Watergate, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 161, 175–76 (2012)
(explaining that ever-expanding universe of federal criminal law requires DOJ to prioritize which
laws to enforce and which cases to press in court).
109. See Broughton, supra note 108, at 175–76 (noting continued expansion of federal law relative to resources available to enforce it); Price, supra note 103, at 1136–43 (acquiescing to presence of nonenforcement going forward but discussing underlying policy justification’s need to be
consistent with congressional intent); see generally Peter M. Shane, Faithful Nonexecution, 29
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 405 (2019) (discussing faithful nonexecution of the law by executive
branch agencies).
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preferences or other values.110 However, it is also a tool that can serve a
variety of other purposes.111 For example, an agency may not enforce the
law where it believes the law is constitutionally suspect or that it may
lack statutory authority.112 It may also use nonenforcement to prioritize
its use of limited resources or to increase overall effectiveness, given the
ever-expanding United States Code.113 However, obvious or blatant nonenforcement can backfire by incentivizing regulated entities or persons to
flout the law because they know prosecution is unlikely.114 Furthermore,
the line between faithful and unfaithful nonenforcement is thin, hinging
on hazy concepts such as transparency, clarity, and fidelity to legislative
intent.115 Thus, limited resources and the presence of other policy and
political factors guarantee that the DOJ either cannot or will not enforce
every federal statute.
B. Regulatory Capture and the STB
Concerns regarding STB regulation of the railroad industry and passenger rail can be traced back to Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC).116 The STB was created in 1996 by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, which abolished the ICC, the nation’s
original independent regulatory agency.117 Congress abolished the
agency after passing a string of new laws deregulating the transportation

110. See Shane, supra note 109, at 423–27 (describing nonenforcement rationales of “Policy
Resistance” and “Non-Program Values”); see also Rena Steinzor, Regulatory Review, Biden Style,
REGUL. REV. (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.theregreview.org/2021/02/15/steinzor-regulatory-review-biden-style/ [https://perma.cc/E3UK-6AUE] (describing political and policy implications of
regulatory review process throughout last three presidential administrations).
111. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 109, at 416–23 (describing nonenforcement decision due to
doubts about a law’s constitutionality, agency’s legal authority, statutory waivers, or pragmatic
resource and mission considerations).
112. Id. at 416–18.
113. Id. at 420–23.
114. See Price, supra note 103, at 1138 (“[T]he more public the nonenforcement policy, the
stronger the signal to regulated parties that they may organize their behavior around the enforcement policy rather than the statute or regulation.”).
115. See id. at 1137–38 (describing how transparency, clarity, and central direction are “vices”
for enforcement but “virtues” in other administrative contexts, illustrating these concepts’ complexity).
116. See generally Anthony Johnstone, Captive Regulators, Captive Shippers: The Legacy of
McCarty Farms, 70 MONT. L. REV. 239 (2009) (expressing concerns about regulatory capture of
the STB in light of the ICC’s history).
117. Legal Resources, SURFACE TRANSP. BD., https://prod.stb.gov/resources/legal-resources/#legislation [https://perma.cc/SHH3-UZ3C] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022) (“The STB is the
successor agency to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Effective January 1, 1996, the
ICC was abolished pursuant to the ICC Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA).”). The ICC was the
original agency regulating safety and economic issues regarding intercity buses, interstate trucking,
and railroads. Scott Mall, Flashback: The Story Behind the Once-Mighty Interstate Commerce
Commission, FREIGHTWAVES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.freightwaves.com/news/economics/flashback-friday-interstate-commerce-commission-1 [https://perma.cc/78R8-C5YZ].
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sector with the support of pro-deregulation commissioners.118 By this
point, however, the railroad industry had already captured the ICC.119
The ICC was created to regulate railroads at a time when farmers and
other shippers were leveraging their political power to combat abuses in
the marketplace.120 However, the railroad industry started to support ICC
regulation as the Commission began to serve as its protector and the attention of shippers began to wane.121 Railroads and railroad industry publications eventually began to praise the commission and the cooperation
between it and the industry.122 The “bargain” was that the ICC would
protect the railroads from competition and pricing reforms, in exchange
for the industry protecting the ICC’s independence and advocating for its
empowerment.123 In this way, protecting the railroads and ensuring revenue adequacy displaced the ICC’s original goal of protecting shippers and
the traveling public.124
More than twenty years after its creation, the STB may be showing
indications of regulatory capture reminiscent of the problems at the
ICC.125 Some argue that shippers, which rely on the STB for rate
118. See Mall, supra note 117 (noting passage of Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Bus Regulatory Reform
Act of 1982, Trucking Industry Regulatory Reform Act of 1994, and other laws along with deregulatory actions by numerous presidents and “pro-deregulation ICC commissioners”).
119. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 116, at 266 (internal citation omitted) (“[S]o many economists . . . have denounced the ICC for its pro-railroad policies that this has become a cliché of
literature.”); Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads,
and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 472 (1952) (“The present marasmus of the ICC is due
to continued dependence upon railroad support.”). Regulatory capture, simply, can be defined as
“when regulatory agencies become dominated by the very industries they were charged with regulating . . . .” John B. Taylor, The Danger of Regulatory Capture, POLICYED (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://www.policyed.org/intellections/danger-regulatory-capture/video [https://perma.cc/BR2SGXB6].
120. See Huntington, supra note 119, at 470–71 (describing early efforts in railroad regulation
and formation of ICC).
121. See id. at 471–72 (“Continued reliance upon the old sources of support would have resulted
in decreasing viability. Therefore[,] the Commission turned more and more to the railroad industry
itself, particularly the railroad management group.”).
122. Id. at 473–74.
123. See id. at 474, 477, 481 (explaining railroads’ actions in support of ICC and resulting benefits they gained).
124. See Johnstone, supra note 116, at 266–67 (“[T]he Commission . . . assumed a duty to
protect railroad interests . . . .”).
125. See generally id.; see also ROSLYN LAYTON, THE SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS OF
REGULATORY OBSOLESCENCE IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES 6–8 (2019), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Signs-and-Symptoms-of-Regulatory-Obsolescence-in-Network-Industries.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S23-L58L ] (addressing regulatory capture in STB and Federal Communications Commission); see, e.g., Jennifer Pucci, Antitrust Law or ‘Public Interest’ Standard?:
An Analysis of the Surface Transportation Board’s Approval of the Union Pacific-Southern Pacific
Merger 2 (2006) (unpublished manuscript), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/public_studies_fr28902/regulated_pdf/060518_Pucci_student_paper_Regulated.pdf [https://perma.cc/7S8NDFHY ] (claiming that “political capture” caused STB to approve Union Pacific-Southern Pacific
merger in violation of its public-interest mandate).
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regulation, have captured the agency; others argue that it is the railroad
who captured it.126 Even others claim that there is no such capture.127 The
concern is that the relevant corporate interests and interest groups may
gain control over the process due to its incredibly “sector-specific nature,” arcane processes, and lack of attention from scholars, policymakers, and the public.128 Specifically, the deck may be stacked against shippers and in favor of freight railroads due to changes in the law and the
probability that blame will fall to the STB should any railroad fail.129
Surface Transportation Board members are term-limited political appointees of the sole agency with the authority to economically regulate
railroads.130 Further, the STB’s responsibility for freight rail success or
failure is cemented firmly by the requirement that it take the railroads’
“revenue adequacy” into account when making regulatory decisions.131
To be sure, there are questions as to whether this purported trend has impacted Amtrak’s current relationship with host railroads and the STB.132
However, the STB certainly has incentives to regulate the nation’s rails
in a way that prioritizes freight railroad profits and shipper expenses over
the public interest.133 Therefore, both DOJ and STB enforcement create
multiple ways in which politics and private interests can interfere with
the enforcement of the law and attainment of Amtrak’s policy goals.
IV. TRACK WARRANT: INDEPENDENT AGENCY LITIGATION AUTHORITY
Agency control of federal litigation can often lead to intense political

126. See LAYTON, supra note 125, at 5 (arguing that railroad customers have sought increased
influence over railroad ratemaking); Johnstone, supra note 116, at 266–72 (expressing concern that
railroads have captured STB at the expense of captive shippers).
127. See Frank N. Wilner, STB No Place for Transactional Decision-Making, RY. AGE (Oct.
29, 2019), https://www.railwayage.com/news/stb-no-place-for-transactional-decision-making/
[https://perma.cc/CR9V-UYX5] (claiming that shippers want to dissolve the STB because STB is
more friendly to railroad mergers than DOJ could be).
128. See LAYTON, supra note 125, at 6–7 (explaining dynamics of railroad regulation that foster
capture).
129. See Johnstone, supra note 116, at 266–68 (“The Commission’s and Board’s institutional
tendency toward regulatory capture is exacerbated not only by an ambivalent mission to protect
railroads alongside shippers, but also by the complexity of the regulatory structure put in place to
execute that mission.”).
130. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(b)(1), (b)(3) (describing appointment of board members and their
terms of service); see also 49 U.S.C. § 10501 (laying out STB’s jurisdiction regarding railroads).
131. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10701, 10704 (establishing criteria for economic regulation of railroads subject to STB jurisdiction).
132. See, e.g., Application of the Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. Under 49 U.S.C. § 24308(a)—
Can. Nat’l Ry. Co., Docket No. FD 35743, Dec. ID 46869, at 7–25 (S.T.B. Aug. 19, 2019),
https://dcms-external.s3.amazonaws.com/MPD/62491/E47A735A456867418525845100545A39/
46869.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL4C-6MFS] (providing fair and equal treatment to Amtrak and Canadian National’s claims in a contractual dispute over on-time and other performance terms without
indicating a bias).
133. See generally Johnstone, supra note 116.
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fights with significant consequences.134 Such tension can be seen in the
DOJ, where centralizing supervision in Washington, D.C., serves to increase the influence of the president’s political and policy priorities on
enforcement decisions.135 Thus, Congress has worked to keep the DOJ
decentralized despite executive attempts to rein in control.136
The political implications of centralized litigation authority also exist
in the dynamic between the DOJ and other federal agencies.137 The DOJ,
by default, handles all litigation involving the federal government and its
constituent agencies unless Congress specifically decides otherwise.138
The DOJ has fought hard to retain as much of this centralization as possible, claiming it is necessary to coordinate the government’s litigation
positions, assure presidential oversight, and allow objective lawyers to
make filing decisions.139 The executive branch’s zealousness in defense
of this centralization has far outstripped congressional desires to lessen
presidential control via independent litigating authority.140 However,
Congress has still found it necessary to award independent litigating authority where DOJ enforcement was lacking.141 With this background, the
following sections will discuss the motivations for congressional grants
of independent litigating authority and the costs and benefits of granting
agencies such authority.142
A. Advancing Public Policy: Why Agency Litigation Authority?
Over the years, Congress has given a handful of agencies independent
134. See generally Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back
and Looking Forward, 58 DUKE L.J. 2087 (2008) (discussing battle between legislative and executive branches regarding centralized control of DOJ litigation).
135. See id. at 2094 (explaining that legislative efforts to increase DOJ centralization would
increase presidential and attorney-general influence).
136. See id. at 2107–09 (“Indeed, the interesting part is not the reaction of a newly elected
Democratic Congress to the Bush administration’s centralization efforts but the prior acquiescence
of Republican legislators.”).
137. See generally Devins & Herz, supra note 100 (describing dynamic between executive
branch’s desire for centralized control and Congress’s occasional desire to grant other agencies
litigating authority).
138. See 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (“[T]he head of an Executive department or military department may
not employ an attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation, . . . but shall refer the matter to the
Department of Justice.”); 28 U.S.C. § 516 (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party . . . is reserved to
officers of the Department of Justice . . . .”).
139. See The Attorney General’s Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. O.L.C. 47,
54 (1982) [hereinafter The Attorney General’s Role].
140. See Devins & Herz, supra note 100, at 218–22 (discussing differences in intensity between
presidential preferences and congressional preferences).
141. See id. at 217–18 (explaining Federal Trade Commission’s acquisition of independent litigating authority in 1975 through FTC Improvements Act).
142. See discussion infra Section III.A (discussing motivations and benefits for granting agencies independent litigating authority); see also discussion infra Section III.B (discussing costs and
disadvantages of granting agencies independent litigating authority).
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litigating authority to enforce some or all of their statutes.143 Agencies
where independence is seen as having some value—such as the Federal
Trade Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal Communication Commission, and the United States Postal Service—
received statutory authority to represent themselves in court to varying
degrees.144 Often, this litigation authority stems from a specific battle in
an agency’s history.145 The primary benefits are: (1) a desire to limit the
role that politics plays in policy-making, and (2) valuing litigators with
greater subject-matter expertise.146
1. Agency Independence from Politics and the Executive
The most obvious reason Congress grants agencies litigating authority
is to insulate them from presidential or, more broadly, executive control.147 Congress can do this for a variety of reasons. Congress may desire
a greater role in oversight of the agency’s actions or areas of expertise for
itself.148 Congress could wish to reduce the influence of politics on enforcement of the agency’s statutory or regulatory program.149 Finally,
Congress could want to ensure that the policy preferences of the executive do not override those of Congress at the time or when the relevant
143. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 920–
21 (2014) (describing how independent litigating authority fits into construction of boundary agencies).
144. See id. (discussing differences in litigating authority for boundary agencies). For instance,
some agencies have complete authority to litigate independently, while others may only do so until
a case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court. See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor
General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 278 (1994) (describing boundaries between agency and solicitor-general authority in independent-agency litigation).
145. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 143, at 921 (describing how the USPS received independent litigation authority).
146. See discussion infra Sections II.A.1, A.2 (surveying these advantages).
147. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 801–02 (2013) (“The effect of independent litigation
authority is a degree of insulation from executive control.”). But cf. KTVB Staff & Keith Ridler,
House Oks Bill to Let Agencies Bypass Idaho Attorney General, KTVB7 (updated Feb. 25, 2021,
3:45 PM), https://www.ktvb.com/article/news/local/208/bill-to-bypass-attorney-generals-lawyersadvances-to-idaho-house/277-72b19c50-5a65-4a92-aebe-fe392800b4ac [https://perma.cc/S9YUBC3X] (“The bill removes a requirement that outside attorneys be screened by the attorney general
and a board of statewide-elected officials . . . . Supporters of the legislation contend the attorney
general’s office frequently interprets the law contrary to the opinion lawmakers want to hear, and
agencies should be able to shop around for lawyers.”).
148. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 147, at 801 (“Centralized litigation control increases
agency independence from Congress . . . [, which has] little control over the DOJ’s budget or decision making.”).
149. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 95–96 (1994) (“Congress’ decision . . . to charge [the FEC] with the civil enforcement of the FECA was undoubtedly
influenced by Congress’ belief that the Justice Department, headed by a Presidential appointee,
might choose to ignore infractions committed by members of the President's own political party.”);
see, e.g., Devins, supra note 144, at 276–77 (describing how solicitor general contorted government’s position in Bob Jones University v. United States based on politics).
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statute was enacted.150
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is one example illustrative of this concern.151 The saga began with the EPA’s formation in the
1970s, when Congress provided the agency with authority to litigate if
the DOJ was unable or unwilling to represent it under the Clean Air,
Clean Water, or Safe Drinking Water Acts.152 As the decade wore on,
however, the DOJ gained a reputation for dragging its feet on environmental cases outside those arenas, refusing to consult with the EPA and
creating bad caselaw.153 In contrast, the EPA had shown itself a competent enforcer and capable of independence amidst consistent congressional expansion of its role.154 Congress, thus, became concerned that
DOJ was providing poor representation and lacked “sufficient enforcement enthusiasm.”155 However, disagreement between the agencies and
an intra-congressional turf battle led to inaction.156
These problems have continued since—through the 1980s and 1990s
and into the present day.157 The 1980s saw renewed proposals for general
EPA litigating authority because the DOJ earned a reputation for pressuring the EPA to invoke executive privilege before Congress and failing to
act in prominent cases.158 These efforts, however, stalled due to Congress’s suspicion of the Reagan administration’s good faith in control of
the agency.159 In the 1990s, Congress worried that Main Justice was stifling local U.S. Attorneys’ attempts to prosecute environmental
150. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 100, at 280–81 (explaining the Reagan and Bush administrations’ battles regarding EPA’s authority to police federal agencies’ facilities and their impact on
environment). It should be noted, however, that Congress still needs to be invested in the Agency’s
mission and willing to police the boundaries it draws for the strategy to work. See id. at 285–96
(discussing how Congress failed to prevent Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from becoming politically subservient to DOJ).
151. See Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on
Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1349–60 (2000) (recounting history of negative
relations between EPA and DOJ dating back to 1970s).
152. See id. at 1350–51 (discussing EPA’s litigating authority under respective laws passed in
1970, 1972, and 1974).
153. See id. at 1352–54 (describing attacks on DOJ environmental litigation during consideration of the Clean Air Act’s 1977 Amendments).
154. See id. at 1353–54 (discussing how EPA attorneys and experts had superior knowledge
allowing them to successfully litigate).
155. See id. (“In short, the backers of this provision were concerned about two recurrent issues:
(1) they felt that poor DOJ representation was resulting in court losses, and (2) they felt that a lack
of sufficient enforcement enthusiasm was resulting in important, winnable cases simply not being
brought.”).
156. See id. at 1354 (“[R]esistance came from the Senate Judiciary Committee, which did not
want to reduce its oversight responsibilities by narrowing DOJ control of litigation.”).
157. See id. at 1355–59 (describing continued battles about EPA’s enforcement authority).
158. See id. at 1355–57 (discussing Congress’s efforts to confer litigating authority to EPA with
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
159. See id. at 1355–56 (“[B]ad blood between the Congress and the EPA helped force Burford,
Lavelle, and twenty other Reagan appointees to leave the EPA in disgrace.”).
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crimes.160 Thus, there was a concern that the EPA’s lack of litigating authority could undermine its regulatory program.161 This concern and the
realities behind it have artificially limited the EPA to administrative enforcement and remedies in order to avoid political interference and the
DOJ’s inadequate representation and plain refusal to bring winnable
cases.162 The dynamic can make the case for providing EPA with independent litigating authority in future legislation.163
2. A Need for Specialized Litigators and Enforcers
Lawyers in a government agency generally have different views from
those on the outside.164 In this way, requiring an agency to have outside
counsel puts it in a vulnerable position: making the agency dependent on
the DOJ to represent it in court.165 The DOJ’s own priorities in an area or
on a topic can cause the agency’s subject-matter priorities to take a back
seat.166 However, the subject matter can, in itself, cause problems in DOJ
representation.
An agency’s own attorneys—who both write the regulations and work
under them and the relevant statutes every day—certainly have more subject-matter knowledge than a DOJ attorney unfamiliar with the area.167
160. See id. at 1357–58 (“The subcommittee’s essential concern was that political pressures to
go easy on polluters were being applied to officials in Main Justice, who in turn were undermining
the enforcement efforts of line attorneys and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. . . . There followed almost
three years of hearings, investigatory interviews, exchanges of letters, reports, subpoenas, threats,
and bluster.”).
161. See id. at 1359–61 (“Let us start with a strong hypothesis: DOJ representation actually
does harm to the agency’s program. DOJ attorneys will decline to pursue winnable cases, will make
litigating errors, and will disrupt agency decision-making in ways that will predictably weaken and
dilute agency initiatives.”). Further, the impression continues that politics is playing a role in the
stifling EPA enforcement priorities. See id. at 1359 (“Except for the Carter and Clinton Administrations, the EPA has for its entire history been implementing essentially Democratic statutes for
a Republican president.”).
162. See id. at 1361–71 (discussing impacts of DOJ’s hesitance to enforce environmental laws
in many cases).
163. See generally id. Though it should be noted that the authors stop short of this recommendation and claim that “careful consideration of context and the importance of effective and mutually
considerate working relationships” are the more-important takeaways. Id. at 1374–75.
164. See, e.g., Devins & Herz, supra note 100, at 205–06 (“For agency lawyers, our project was
a breath of fresh air—a chance to extol their underutilized litigation skills and vent frustration at
DOJ. For some DOJ officials, our project was an invitation to disaster. . . . In the halls of Congress,
however, staffers . . . wondered why two law professors would invest so much energy in a project
that held so little interest.”).
165. See Devins, supra note 144, at 317 (“Supporters of Solicitor General control of government
Supreme Court litigation most commonly argue that the Solicitor General’s screening of governmental cases ‘guard[s] the door to the Supreme Court, to make sure that only the most important
cases are appealed.’”).
166. See, e.g., id. at 270–71 (explaining differences between DOJ’s and FTC’s position in specific cases and how division of litigation authority caused it to play out).
167. See Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, 85 F.R.D. 155, 171–72 (1979) (“[A]n agency lawyer who has worked on a regulation since
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They know why a regulation exists, the real-world situations in which it
is applied, and the reasoning of their own agency with much greater certainty.168 Thus, the desire to leave certain, specific subjects to the experts
has resulted in the creation of specialized courts and special litigation authority in agencies like the Internal Revenue Service.169 Indeed, agency
attorneys will go so far as to say the DOJ does not understand the needs
of their agency clients.170 Further, the agencies are unable to remedy the
issues they see because they are captive clients with nowhere else to go.171
Others claim that the agencies are not receiving deficient representation.172 This can mean the agencies are simply frustrated at the inability
to pursue their selfish or parochial interests—e.g., tunnel vision,173—or
that any deficiencies are not significant enough to actually impact the result of any individual case.174 In a similar vein, the lack of subject-matter
expertise could simply be a trade-off for the net positive of having a
“firm” of litigation specialists handling your case.175 However, those who
think this lack of technical expertise has little practical impact still
acknowledge its existence.176 Thus, desires to insulate programs from political influence and emphasize agency expertise in regulatory enforcement are the motives and benefits that overcome the costs of decentralization when an agency is granted its own independent litigating authority.

its inception or has worked on a program for a number of years simply knows more about it and
knows more about the needs that gave rise to it, the policies that it reflects, and the practical problems that arise in its implementation, than does his counterpart in the Department of Justice.”).
168. See id. (noting agency lawyers’ advantage over those from DOJ).
169. See Devins, supra note 144, at 269 (identifying limits on DOJ’s litigating authority).
170. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the Civil Division, 23
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 185–86 (1990) (“Agency lawyers charged that Justice Department lawyers did not understand the programs and needs of the clients.”).
171. See id. at 185 (“The Civil Division lawyers, however, almost always do have an identifiable client . . . an agency whose programs are at issue in litigation . . . . Civil Division clients differ
from individual and corporate clients, however, because they are captives.”).
172. See Herz & Devins, supra note 151, at 1361–63 (“Our own concededly impressionistic
sense is that agency losses, when they occur, are rarely the consequence of a lawyer’s error of a
sort that a DOJ lawyer would make and an agency lawyer would avoid.”).
173. See Babcock, supra note 170, at 185 (“Like private clients, they require soothing and handholding, expect miracles from their lawyers, and are often totally selfish in their outlook.”). Babcock further claimed that her tenure at the DOJ “was not an ideal [time] to urge the idea that the
government lawyer should represent interests beyond the immediate goals of the client agency.”
Id. at 187.
174. See Herz & Devins, supra note 151, at 1362 (“But are the agencies losing cases they should
not be? In fact, probably not.”).
175. See id. at 1362 (“After all, DOJ attorneys are pretty good and the government wins most
of its cases. And while DOJ may not seek the help of agency attorneys as often as it should, it can
and does seek such assistance.”); Babcock, supra note 170, at 186 (“I found myself often arguing
that litigators are better at translating the technical concerns of the agencies to the fact-finders precisely because they are not experts in the programs.”).
176. See Herz & Devins, supra note 151, at 1362 (acknowledging DOJ’s lack of subject-matter
expertise but claiming that it likely has little practical impact).
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B. Fighting and Fiefdoms: Drawbacks to Decentralized Litigation
Authority
As explained above, the DOJ is the default litigating agency for the
United States.177 Congress enacted statutes creating this state of affairs—
implying Congress presumably saw value in concentrating litigation authority.178 The most frequently cited benefits to centralized litigating authority are: (1) coordination of the government’s proceedings and litigating positions, (2) facilitation of executive supervision, and (3)
specialization of the government’s litigation function.179 These principal
benefits are discussed below.
1. Unifying the Fiefdoms: Coordinating Among the Agencies
The first benefit to centralization is that it allows the attorney general
to coordinate the litigation of client agencies.180 This allows the attorney
general, through the DOJ, to consider legal issues in light of the best interests of the federal government as a whole, rather than merely in relation to the interests of an individual agency.181 The DOJ can reconcile
disagreements between the agencies and ensure the federal government
has uniform positions on issues recurring in numerous contexts. 182 Further, the DOJ uses this consistency to assure equal protection to parties
subject to regulation and provide the government credibility in litigation.183 Thus, the DOJ and its supporters argue that there is a need for

177. See generally The Attorney General’s Role, supra note 139 (describing and defending
DOJ’s historic status).
178. See id. at 51–53 (outlining statutory basis for DOJ’s position as default litigator, primarily
under 5 U.S.C. § 3106 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 515–16, 519).
179. See id. at 54–55 (“The policy considerations which support the centralization of federal
litigating authority in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Attorney General, are
many.”).
180. See id. at 54 (“In this way, the Attorney General is better able to coordinate the legal involvements of each ‘client’ agency with those of other ‘client’ agencies, as well as with the broader
legal interests of the United States overall.”).
181. See id. (“It is [DOJ’s] responsibility to ensure that the interests of the United States as a
whole . . . are given a paramount position over potentially conflicting interests between subordinate
segments of the government . . . .”).
182. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator Between Court and Agency,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 192–94 (“The potential for conflict is most obvious when two or more
agencies disagree on a particular legal or policy question. . . . A similar type of conflict can arise
when an agency adopts a position on a legal issue that will recur in many different contexts—e.g.,
a procedural rule involving the requirements for pleading.”); see, e.g., Devins, supra note 144, at
270–71 (describing conflicts between Federal Trade Commission, the DOJ Antitrust Division, and
Solicitor General).
183. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of
Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 572–73, 575–76 (2003) (describing possibility that
different agencies may regulate same problem differently without coordination and government’s
resulting loss of credibility before the courts).
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centralized litigating authority for consistency’s sake.184
2. Transparency Through Centralization: Executive Supervision of
Litigation
The next frequently cited benefit to DOJ control over most or all federal litigating authority is that it centralizes the responsibility in a place
closer to the president.185 Since Franklin Roosevelt, presidents have recognized the importance of centralized litigation authority in their control
over the administrative state.186 The president receives numerous benefits
from this control.187 First, this control allows the president to intervene in
disputes between executive agencies to ensure that the administration
puts forward the president’s view of the public good. 188 This allows the
president to ensure some level of coordination among agency heads.189
Second, the universal, or near-universal, nature of the control allows a
measure of executive power over independent agencies.190 Although a
president would be unable to control the decisions of an independent
agency or remove its officials, he retains influence through his ability to
direct the DOJ’s representation of the agency.191 Thus, DOJ control allows the president to better exercise policy preferences as the nation’s
elected executive.192
The common relationship between the president and the attorney
184. See The Attorney General’s Role, supra note 139, at 54–55 (justifying centralization of
litigating authority in DOJ based on policy considerations).
185. See id. at 54 (“[T]he centralization of authority and supervision over federal litigation in
the Department of Justice [allows] . . . the facilitation of presidential supervision, through the Attorney General, over Executive Branch policies that are implicated in litigation . . . .”). However, it
should be noted that litigation before the Supreme Court may be the exception at times due to the
traditional independence of the Solicitor General from presidential and DOJ control. See Lemos,
supra note 182, at 213–22 (explaining Solicitor General’s accountability to and independence from
head of executive branch); but see Devins, supra note 144, at 260 (“However, the Solicitor General
is the Executive Branch’s advocate before the Supreme Court, and his loyalty properly belongs to
the Attorney General and the President.”).
186. See Devins & Herz, supra note 100, at 219 (“By centralizing litigation authority in a single
department, Roosevelt sought to strengthen his hold on the burgeoning administrative state.”).
187. See id. (“In part, just as decentralized arrangements bolster congressional power, the President benefits from centralization.”).
188. See id. (“These individuals have different visions of the social good, serve different constituencies, and are subject to different oversight committees.”).
189. See id. (“Departmental and executive agency heads . . . are rarely appointed to help put
into place a coordinated White House-driven vision of some public policy objective.”).
190. See Devins, supra note 100, at 278 (“Intuitively, administrators and commissioners, secure
in their offices, are better able to defy Executive wishes and assert independent authority.”).
191. See Devins, supra note 144, at 287–88 (“The President apparently lacks the power to remove commissioners of whose conclusions he disapproves, but he is free to tell the commissioners’
lawyer, the Solicitor General, whether the agencies’ cases shall be pursued before the Supreme
Court and how they shall be presented before the Court.”).
192. See Devins & Herz, supra note 183, at 577–79 (explaining how DOJ control of litigation
can be used as a “perverse” method for controlling agency policymaking, though expressing doubts
as to its relative significance as opposed to other means of control).
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general likely bears out the DOJ’s importance to presidential control.193
In most administrations, the attorney general is considered “a close confidante” of the president, serving as both a policy and a legal advisor.194
The DOJ has gone on the offensive to contest agencies’ independent litigating authority where possible.195 Further, the DOJ has made decisions
in defending its “client” agencies that serve to save the presidential administration embarrassment where public reaction is fiercely hostile.196
Reframed, these observations can be said to demonstrate the added democratic accountability resulting from DOJ control of litigation and resulting responsiveness to public concerns.197 Thus, the phenomenon of DOJ
centralization is said to promote transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in the administrative state.198
3. Expertise Through Specialization: Centralization for Better Results
The final benefit often cited is the expertise the DOJ gains through its
status as the primary federal litigator and the advantages that accrue to
agencies utilizing the DOJ’s expertise.199 This has been expressed in a
number of ways. First, some say that the impact comes from the DOJ’s
function as a fresh set of eyes that can see new approaches and screen out
bad cases.200 Second, the DOJ is said to possess significantly better litigation skills resulting from its expertise, benefitting client agencies

193. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 144, at 266–67 (describing efforts of Carter and Reagan Justice Departments to control federal litigation, including the Reagan DOJ’s fight against Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
194. See id. at 282–83 (discussing Attorney General’s role as “a legal and policy advisor to the
President”); Devins & Herz, supra note 100, at 219 (“Unlike most agency and department heads,
the Attorney General is usually a close confidante of the President, in many cases someone who
was active in the President’s political campaign and possesses deep personal loyalty to the President.”).
195. See generally Devins, supra note 100 (describing numerous conflicts between DOJ and
independent agencies regarding litigation authority).
196. See Devins, supra note 144, at 276 (describing DOJ and Treasury Department decisionmaking in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)).
197. See, e.g., id. (explaining that DOJ asked that an adverse attorney be appointed to argue Bob
Jones University due to public outcry at federal government’s refusal to defend the nondiscrimination provision at issue).
198. See The Attorney General’s Role, supra note 139, at 54–55 (defending DOJ’s centralized
litigation authority).
199. See Lemos, supra note 182, at 188 (“In part because of its repeat-player status, and in part
because of the talent and expertise of its staff, the Office of the Solicitor General enjoys tremendous
success before the Supreme Court. The SG is far more successful than other litigants . . . .”).
200. See Babcock, supra note 170, at 186 (“[L]itigators are better at translating the technical
concerns of the agencies to the fact-finders precisely because they are not experts in the programs.
A fresh eye, independent look, the ability to ask and answer the basic questions—these are the skills
of the Department of Justice . . . .”); Herz & Devins, supra note 151, at 1366–67 (“The fact that the
EPA is not always as careful or workmanlike in its referrals as it might be can be offered as a reason
for DOJ supervision and control of litigation; stated in the extreme, the EPA has shown that it lacks
the self-discipline and professionalism to litigate on its own.”).
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through its litigation prowess.201 Finally, the DOJ is said to attract more
talented and qualified attorneys than other agencies due to its prestige and
the amount of interesting, varied legal work.202 Supporters of DOJ control
of agency litigation will say that the DOJ simply has numerous practical
advantages over its “clients’” attorneys.203
There are detractors from this view of centralization’s advantages.204
For example, it can be said that the DOJ’s prestige, talent, and expertise
could be acquired by other agencies if they were allowed to litigate their
entire caseload regularly and build a litigation division.205 Agencies may
refer borderline cases because they know the DOJ will vet them again
regardless of their efforts.206 Nonetheless, there is insufficient experience
or study to say with certainty whether the DOJ supporters or detractors
are correct.207
Scholars and practitioners have weighed DOJ-controlled and agencycontrolled litigation systems for some time.208 There are numerous points
in favor of agency control, including promoting agency independence and
the subject-matter specialization of litigators.209 However, DOJ control
also has advantages, including development of expertise in litigation, promoting transparency, and presenting a unified governmental voice in
court.210 As a result, there are a number of considerations that go into
granting government entities their own litigating authority. These will be
discussed in the context of Amtrak and its passenger-preference
201. See Michael Herz, Structures of Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 7 FORDHAM ENV’T
L.J. 679, 715 (1996) (“There are separate litigation skills, wholly independent of the particular
substantive law violated, in criminal prosecutions—more so than in any other area of litigation
. . . . Technical [subject-matter] expertise is much less important [at trial].”).
202. See Devins & Herz, supra note 183, at 584–85 (“[I]t is often said that DOJ is a more prestigious position that does more interesting work and therefore attracts and can pick from a more
talented applicant pool. Since it has better lawyers, it should handle the high-stakes, difficult work
of litigation.”).
203. See id. (identifying additional alleged practical advantages afforded to DOJ lawyers over
agency lawyers).
204. See generally id. at 583–95 (weighing merits of above-mentioned benefits with related
drawbacks and realities of current status quo).
205. See id. at 583–86 (“To be sure, we must to some extent take the world as we find it. In a
sense, all characteristics of an agency are ‘acquired’ rather than ‘inherent,’ because the agency is
an artificial creation that can be eliminated or remade.”).
206. See id. at 585–89 (citation omitted) (“There is no reason to assume that ‘[i]f the DOJ monopoly were removed . . .’ agencies would ‘press weak arguments, in perhaps insignificant cases,
leading to a system-wide loss in credibility’ and, with it, ‘a reduction in success’ . . . . Instead, it
seems more likely that agencies will screen cases with some care.”).
207. See id. at 586 (“To be sure, we must to some extent take the world as we find it.”).
208. See generally, e.g., The Attorney General’s Role, supra note 139 (analyzing the issue from
DOJ’s perspective); Devins & Herz, supra note 183 (analyzing from academic perspective); Babcock, supra note 170 (analyzing from perspective of a DOJ-attorney-turned-academic).
209. See discussion supra Section III.A (discussing advantages of agency-controlled litigation
authority).
210. See discussion supra Section III.B (discussing disadvantages of agency-controlled litigation authority).
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enforcement problem in the next Part.211
V. EXTENDED AUTHORITY: SOLVING THE ENFORCEMENT BLOCKADE
THROUGH SELF-HELP
It is clear that Amtrak needs help to improve service quality and increase ridership.212 Observers agree that Amtrak’s inability to run on time
and its lack of reliability damage its reputation and makes some routes
nearly unusable.213 Objective standards confirm this point.214 Further,
Amtrak has been unable to enforce its rights to preferential track usage
on its own and cannot obtain cooperation from the DOJ or its host railroads.215 Thus, despite consistent ridership and monetary gains, American passenger rail has been demoralized and lacks credibility.216 This lack
of credibility and morale hampers Amtrak’s ability to effectively provide
its current services, plan for the future, and expand its capacity and geographic coverage. Many passengers continue to prefer high-emitting
transportation options due to their consistency and relative speed.217 Further, a common refrain from opponents to expansion or continued funding of the railroad is its failure to provide a credible transportation alternative.218
211. See discussion infra Part IV (proposing that Amtrak be granted litigating authority to enforce its preference rights on host-railroad track networks).
212. See discussion supra Section I.B (discussing neglect of Amtrak’s passenger-preference
rights and shortcomings of current approaches to this problem).
213. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 7 (quoting Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg, who
said, “[w]e’ve been asked to settle for less in this country” from American passenger rail relative
to other countries); Yglesias, supra note 50 (“The second question . . . is why passenger rail outside
of the Northeast Corridor is so unimaginably awful.”); Laitner, supra note 7 (demonstrating
Amtrak’s notoriously poor public reputation).
214. See HOST RAILROAD REPORT CARD, supra note 12 (demonstrating that thirty-four of
forty-two Amtrak routes run more than fifteen minutes late greater than twenty percent of the time,
with many of those running late in sixty percent or more of trips).
215. See FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–4 (explaining Amtrak’s inability to enforce its
own preference rights in court and DOJ’s lack of action); OIG Report, supra note 59, at 15 (explaining that freight railroads, DOJ, and Congress have not taken action despite lobbying from
Amtrak). Further, the consistency of the DOJ’s nonenforcement of the passenger preference since
the late 1970s suggests that legitimate ends are responsible. See FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16,
at 3–4 (illustrating history of passenger-preference enforcement); cf. Price, supra note 103, at 1138
(explaining that such obvious, consistent nonenforcement can send a “strong[] signal to regulated
parties that they can [act based on] the enforcement policy rather than the statute”).
216. See OIG REPORT, supra note 59, at 15 (describing Amtrak executives’ loss of faith in
attempts to persuade partners and opponents to address its concerns); NICE, supra note 8, at 15
(describing lack of credibility Amtrak’s consistent performance and organizational issues have
caused).
217. Cf. Laitner, supra note 7 (noting Amtrak’s persistent on-time challenges and lack of reliability, causing many passengers frustration even while enjoying train travel generally).
218. See, e.g., Steven Rattner, Why ‘Amtrak Joe’ Should Pull Back on Train Funding, N.Y.
TIMES (July 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/01/opinion/biden-amtrak-infrastructure.html (discussing difficulty of expanding and investing in American rail-service infrastructure
given more efficient and profitable travel infrastructure in the U.S. such as next-generation air travel
and securing updates to American roads and bridges).
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To address this concern, Amtrak needs the authority to defend its preference rights in court—which is a solution the railroad itself has advocated for.219 The legal change to implement this reform would be simple,
requiring the addition of only one line of text to the current statute.220
Therefore, the decision of whether to make this reform rests primarily on
two considerations: (1) whether recent changes provide sufficient recourse to make this change redundant, and (2) whether the policy rationale justifies the change in light of the structural landscape. These will
be discussed below.221
A. The Current Solution to Passenger-Preference Nonenforcement Is
Insufficient
The most recent solution to passenger-preference nonenforcement—
placing additional authority with the STB222—is insufficient. Giving the
STB ultimate enforcement power is insufficient, because doing so both
fails to solve existing problems and creates new ones.223 First, the decade
of litigation preceding the adoption of a final on-time rule has rendered
the STB’s newfound regulatory authority ineffectual.224 Second, it merely
shifted the same problems from one political actor, the DOJ, to another,
the STB.225 Third, it placed Amtrak’s future in the hands of an entity

219. See GOLDMAN, supra note 24, at 16 (expressing Amtrak’s desire for independent litigating
authority to enforce its preference rights).
220. See, e.g., Rail Passenger Fairness Act, S. 2922, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing amendment
to 49 U.S.C. § 24308(c), stating: “[n]otwithstanding sections 24103(a) and 24308(f), Amtrak shall
have the right to bring an action for equitable or other relief . . . to enforce the preference rights
granted under this subsection”).
221. See discussion infra Sections IV.A, B (arguing that the change is not redundant and is
justified based on current legal and policy landscape).
222. See, e.g., Metrics and Minimum Standards for Intercity Passenger Rail Service, 85 Fed.
Reg. 72,971, 73,000–02 (Nov. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 273 (describing recent rulemaking and the semi-automatic enforcement that FRA-developed standards are supposed to trigger).
223. See 49 U.S.C. § 24101 (allowing for creation of the standard that STB can use to initiate
an investigation); see also 49 U.S.C. § 24308(f)(1) (describing instances in which STB can investigate Amtrak on-time issues).
224. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.—Investigation of Substandard Performance of the
Capitol Ltd., Docket No. NOR 42141, Dec. ID 46360 (S.T.B. Apr. 13, 2018) (dismissing Amtrak’s
attempts to enforce on-time standards due to litigation delaying rule-making process, after continuing the case numerous times in anticipation that litigation would conclude). See generally Ass’n
of Am. R.R. v. Dep’t of Transp., 865 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 2012) (first merits ruling in the litigation); Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 896 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 2665 (2019) (ending the litigation).
225. See discussion supra Section I.B (discussing DOJ’s failure to enforce Amtrak’s preference
rights and its effects on service); compare discussion supra Section II.A (describing decision-making process and trends of nonenforcement at DOJ), with discussion supra Section II.B (describing
some concerns regarding decision-making at STB).
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incentivized to rule against it.226 Therefore, this reform needs to be supplemented. The first challenge is self-explanatory, so we will move on to
the latter two.
The second and third challenges of the existing reform effort, in tandem, create an insurmountable barrier to effective enforcement of
Amtrak’s passenger-preference rights. At the outset, it is clear that the
freight railroads have significant lobbying power in Washington,227 particularly compared to Amtrak.228 In fact, the freight railroads spend significant money on federal campaign contributions and lobbying efforts.229 This political engagement is a likely cause of the lack of
enforcement by the DOJ, an organization designed (to some extent) to
shape federal litigation to the president’s policy and political preferences.230 Political influence on behalf of the regulated group, in particular, is a long-recognized influence on both lawmakers and law enforcers.231
Expanding enforcement authority to the STB does not address the issue
of political influence, however, because control by the politically

226. See, e.g., LAYTON, supra note 125, at 6–8 (illustrating case for shippers’ capture of STB);
see also Johnstone, supra note 116, at 266–72 (making the case for freight railroads’ capture of
STB). Although it could be said that the debate regarding who a captured STB favors indicates a
lack of regulatory capture, both entities’ interests would be best served by prioritizing freight service over passenger service. See Blaze, supra note 84 (suggesting that prioritizing Amtrak’s existing right to track preference could lead to increased prices for rail shippers); see also FED. R.R.
ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–9 (explaining host railroads’ prioritization of their business interests,
suggesting passenger-preference enforcement would be adverse to railroads’ bottom lines).
227. See, e.g., About Us, ASS’N AM. R.R., https://www.aar.org/about-us/ [https://
perma.cc/TU8C-M3NY] (last visited Mar. 22, 2021) (“AAR is the world’s leading railroad policy,
research, standard setting and technology organization that focuses on the safety and productivity
of the U.S. freight rail industry. . . . Policy Making: Working with elected officials and leaders in
Washington, DC, AAR advances sound public policy that supports the interests of the freight rail
industry.”).
228. See, e.g., OIG REPORT, supra note 59, at 15 (explaining that Amtrak stopped tracking
certain metrics due to its ineffectiveness in persuading freight railroads and policymakers).
229. See Railroads, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?
ind=m04 [https://perma.cc/G74R-77QX] (last visited Mar. 22, 2021) [hereinafter OPENSECRETS]
(demonstrating that four of the Class 1 railroads spent a combined $5.1 million on campaign contributions and more than $7.6 million on lobbying in 2020). Amtrak did spend $341,000 on campaign contributions in 2020. Id. This was far less than the contributions of the four high-spending
Class 1 railroads and only slightly higher than Watco (one of the leading shortline railroad conglomerates), however. Id.
230. See FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, 3–4, 4 n.13 (explaining that DOJ has only attempted
to enforce passenger preference once in the law’s history); see also Devins, supra note 100, at 280
(explaining that presidents use control of DOJ to further political and policy goals through nonenforcement).
231. See Richman, supra note 102, at 774–75, 779 (analogizing possible influences well-connected parties have on centralized prosecution and rulemaking authorities to those the same parties
exercise in legislative branch).
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appointed board still introduces it.232 First, there are concerns that the
STB has been “captured” by freight interests in a way similar to the ICC
in its later years.233 This capture results from freight interests gaining political power on the board through its procedure or insulation from public
scrutiny—allowing it or its allies on the board to get an edge.234 This ability is strengthened by the aforementioned political activity of the major
railroads and the influence it could have on the political appointees placed
on the STB board.235 Although the existence of such capture is debated,236
the significant possibility of industry or political hostility undercutting
Amtrak interests makes the current state of affairs less than ideal.237
In addition to this political influence, however, the STB has other reasons to favor the freight railroads.238 Specifically, the STB has a statutory
duty to ensure the freight railroads’ health and to take it into account when
making regulatory decisions.239 Railroad deregulation took away the
board’s regulatory neutrality and made it hostile, or at least indifferent, to
non-freight-railroad interests.240 This tendency is particularly hard to
232. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(b)(1), (b)(3) (describing appointment and term limits of political
appointees to STB). In fact, the agency design seems to have these things in mind based on the
inclusion of term limits and a requirement that no more than three board members be of the same
party. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(b)(1), (b)(3)–(4).
233. See LAYTON, supra note 125, at 6–8 (describing regulatory capture of ICC and concerns
that STB is facing a similar fate).
234. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 119, at 470–81 (describing railroads’ regulatory capture
of ICC in the mid-twentieth century); STB to Review CSX, CP-KCS Cases ‘Expeditiously,’ Chair
Says, PROGRESSIVE RAILROADING (Mar. 24, 2021) [hereinafter PROGRESSIVE RAILROADING],
https://www.progressiverailroading.com/federal_legislation_regulation/news/STB-to-reviewCSX-CP-KSC-cases-expeditiously-chair-says--63044?oly_enc_id=4913J2568489H2X&utm_
medium=email&utm_source=prdailynews&utm_ccampaig=prnewsletter-2021 [https://perma.cc/
ZD8Y-8KXM] (announcing appointment of a railroad insider with ties to Association of American
Railroads as STB’s chief economist).
235. See, e.g., OPENSECRETS, supra note 229 (describing political activity of America’s major
railroads and industry as a whole); ASS’N AM. R.R., supra note 227 (comprising policy arm of
freight-railroad industry); see also Devins, supra note 100, at 280 (explaining use of enforcement
and nonenforcement to achieve policy and political ends). The STB’s signaling an intent to act
“expeditiously” in deciding cases related to recent significant railroad mergers may serve as an
example of this capture depending on how it plays out going forward. See PROGRESSIVE
RAILROADING, supra note 234.
236. See, e.g., Wilner, supra note 127 (claiming that concerns about regulatory capture are “irrational” and merely reflect the result of a board statutorily required to balance multiple competing
interests in decision-making).
237. Cf. Huntington, supra note 119, at 471–74 (recounting negative impacts analogous regulatory capture had on freight-rail market and industry under ICC regulation).
238. See Johnstone, supra note 116, at 266–69 (describing ICC and STB tendency toward industry influence).
239. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 10701, 10704 (providing criteria for STB’s economic regulation of
railroad industry such as requiring determinations of which railroads have “revenue adequacy”).
240. See Johnstone, supra note 116, at 266 (“What is novel about the post-Staggers Act regime
is that the Commission and Board assumed a duty to protect railroad interests and that this duty of
ensuring revenue adequacy expressly constrains the original rate-regulation duty of the Commission. . . . [T]he Board [still] works within a regulatory model built to save the American railroad
industry.”).
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prevent or excise due to the narrow, specialized nature of railroad economic regulation.241 Further, the STB’s responsibilities, its creation in the
shadow of the railroad industry’s near-collapse, and the blame that would
follow for any railroad failure color STB decision-making with a certain
level of risk aversion.242 As a non-freight railroad with a negative reputation,243 Amtrak will certainly be disadvantaged by the STB’s aversion to
act against the interests of the freight railroads.244 To be sure, the DOJ
has set a very low standard when it comes to enforcing Amtrak’s preference rights.245 The STB’s characteristics, however, show that charging
the latter agency with enforcement merely reallocates authority without
improving the situation. As such, providing Amtrak its own enforcement
authority is necessary.
B. Giving Amtrak Enforcement Powers Fits into the Current Litigation
Authority Landscape
Giving Amtrak independent litigation authority with which to enforce
its passenger preference is the proper solution to the current enforcement
deadlock. As established above, independent litigating authority in federal agencies is the exception rather than the rule.246 This independent
authority is common, however, where Congress believes that the relevant
agency needs either additional independence from politics or a team of
specialized attorneys to effectively enforce the statutes for which it is responsible.247 Either way, the purpose of this reallocation of authority
241. See id. at 268 (“The . . . Board’s institutional tendency toward regulatory capture is exacerbated . . . by the complexity of the regulatory structure put in place to execute that mission. Regulatory simplicity can limit this tendency by promoting a more focused and transparent agency
mission . . . .”).
242. See id. at 267 (“The Board’s aversion to the risk of railroad failure . . . may reflect the
traumatic birth of its regulatory model in the railroad crisis of the 1970s. Thirty years later, however, that historic aversion persists despite the railroads’ success under the Staggers Act . . . .”).
243. See Guzman, supra note 7 (explaining woeful state of American passenger-rail system).
Honestly, Amtrak’s history of poor performance, both in a practical and a financial sense, likely
means Amtrak would continue to take the blame for its own future failures at the hands of STB
neglect.
244. See Johnstone, supra note 116, at 266–68 (discussing STB’s tendency toward favoring
freight railroads).
245. See, e.g., FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, 3–4 (outlining history of DOJ’s lack of enforcement or even attempts to bring cases over nearly fifty-year history of passenger-preference
law).
246. See O’Connell, supra note 143, at 920–21 (explaining place of independent litigating authority in federal administrative scheme, particularly its use in independent agencies); 5 U.S.C. §
3106 (requiring all agency heads to refer any litigation to DOJ); 28 U.S.C. § 516 (vesting DOJ with
sole authority to litigate on behalf of federal government where statute is otherwise silent).
247. See O’Connell, supra note 143, at 920–21 (noting Congress’s occasional delegation of
independent litigating authority to agencies); Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 85 F.R.D. 155, 171–72 (1979) (explaining that working
regularly on an issue and writing very regulations defended or enforced in court gives agency attorneys additional knowledge or expertise that can increase effectiveness in litigation).
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away from the DOJ is to correct for DOJ interference in or nonenforcement of the agency’s regulatory scheme.248
Nonenforcement of Amtrak’s passenger preference fits the category of
enforcement situations that counsel independent litigating authority.
Amtrak’s status as a government corporation marks the agency as one
meant to pursue its policy objectives without political interference.249
However, Amtrak has long been plagued by DOJ nonenforcement that
has undercut the agency’s core mission—much like other agencies that
request independent litigating authority.250 To wit, the DOJ’s refusal to
enforce the passenger preference costs the agency needed credibility and
tens of millions of dollars every year.251 Further, railroad economic regulation is a narrow, unique area of law that overlaps with little other
law—meaning Amtrak would benefit from its own specialized representation.252 This consideration also comports with the current practice of
vesting railroad regulation in a specialized agency and allowing Amtrak
to hire its own outside attorneys for much of its litigation.253 Thus,
248. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 95–96 (1994)
(recognizing that Congress’s purpose in repartitioning litigation authority when creating the FEC
was likely out of a desire to promote enforcement of federal election law); Devins, supra note 100,
at 280–81 (explaining Reagan and Bush administrations’ efforts to change federal environmental
policy by refusing to enforce or defend certain federal laws).
249. Compare Fed. Election Comm’n, 513 U.S. at 95–96 (explaining that FEC has independent
litigating authority to insulate it from political interference), with O’Connell, supra note 47, at 888–
89 (explaining that government corporations such as Amtrak are meant to be free from political
interference and, instead, should be disciplined by the free market).
250. Compare FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–9 (illustrating DOJ’s refusal to enforce
passenger-preference laws against freight railroads despite freight railroads’ flagrant refusal to respect Amtrak’s rights), with Herz & Devins, supra note 151, at 1349–60 (describing DOJ’s consistent attempts to undermine EPA programs and authority through nonenforcement and resulting
attempts by members of Congress to grant EPA independent litigating authority), and Elliott Karr,
Independent Litigation Authority and Calls for the Views of the Attorney General, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1080, 1090–93 (2009) (explaining Congress’s grant of litigation authority to Federal Trade
Commission through Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
as a result of DOJ refusal to represent agency’s positions adequately at trial and appellate levels).
251. See OIG REPORT, supra note 59, at 8–9 (totaling annual savings of a properly enforced
preference right at $41.9 million along with $336 million in one-time savings); see also NICE, supra
note 8, at 15 (expressing lack of credibility resulting from Amtrak’s poor performance history).
252. See LAYTON, supra note 125, at 6–7 (describing railroad regulation as an arcane area of
law that is particularly sector-specific); Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Judicial Conference of
the District of Columbia Circuit, 85 F.R.D. 155, 171–72 (1979) (expressing tendency of agency
lawyers to have a significant advantage in subject-matter knowledge compared to DOJ lawyers
placed on many cases).
253. See, e.g., About STB, SURFACE TRANSP. BD., https://prod.stb.gov/about-stb/
[https://perma.cc/N4VS-NB3N] (last visited Mar. 24, 2021) (“The Surface Transportation Board is
an independent federal agency that is charged with the economic regulation of various modes of
surface transportation, primarily freight rail.”); see also Rail Network Development, FED. R.R.
ADMIN., https://railroads.dot.gov/rail-network-development/rail-network-development [https://per
ma.cc/X93H-6ACX] (last visited Mar. 24, 2021) (“FRA accomplishes [its] mission primarily
through issuance, implementation, and enforcement of safety regulations; selective investment to
develop the rail network across the country; and research and technology development.”); Am.
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providing Amtrak with enforcement authority through independent litigating authority in passenger-preference cases would be appropriate insofar as it fits within the current conception of such authority elsewhere
in the federal system.
Although there are drawbacks to independent litigating authority,
these, for the most part, do not apply to Amtrak’s situation. The first common concern is a breakdown in governance due to conflicts between
agencies’ legal positions.254 This is inapplicable because Amtrak, by law,
is to be treated as a private entity and is regulated as a market participant.255 This is similar to the United States Postal Service (USPS), an
entity allowed its own representation where the DOJ refuses to advocate
for its position in court, as the USPS is also a business organization that
is regulated by an independent regulator, the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC).256 That Amtrak, unlike the USPS, is regulated by an agency
that also regulates its private counterparts underscores its treatment as a
private entity.257 Moreover, the proposed expansion of Amtrak’s
Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 709 F.3d 584, 585 (6th Cir. 2013) (serving as an example of Amtrak hiring outside counsel to defend it in federal court). In fact, the inability of Amtrak to file suit to enforce its statutory rights under its authorizing legislation is the
outlier in this situation. Compare Am. Premier Underwriters, 709 F.3d at 585 (hiring outside counsel to defend against action), with 49 U.S.C. § 24103(a)(1) (requiring any enforcement of Amtrak’s
authorizing legislation to originate solely from DOJ).
254. See The Attorney General’s Role, supra note 139, at 54 (explaining that DOJ primacy in
federal litigation is necessary to coordinate litigating positions among different departments and
ensure government’s litigating positions reflect best interests of federal government as a whole).
255. See Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding
that Amtrak could not be too involved in setting on-time performance metrics because it would
violate freight railroads’ due-process rights by allowing a “market competitor” with its own “economic self-interest” to regulate them); see also 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a) (defining Amtrak as a (1) forprofit (2) railroad carrier that (3) is not to be treated as “a department, agency, or instrumentality
of the United States Government”).
256. Compare 49 U.S.C. §§ 24308, 24311(c) (granting STB authority to mediate a variety of
disputes between Amtrak and freight railroads), with About the Postal Regulatory Commission,
POSTAL REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.prc.gov/about [https://perma.cc/BL6G-7P9V] (last visited
Mar. 25, 2021) (explaining PRC’s role as “an independent agency” which exercises “regulatory
oversight over the Postal Service[’s]” operations); see Mail Order Ass’n of Am. v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[First,] when the Postal Service seeks judicial review
under [the statute], it may do so on its own if the [DOJ] has declined to represent its fundamental
positions or to consent to its self-representation; [second,] when a private party challenges a Postal
Service order under [the statute], the Postal Service is entitled to appear and be represented by its
own counsel when its position is inconsistent with that of the [DOJ].”). Though it would be fair to
say that PRC oversight of the USPS is greater than the STB’s oversight of Amtrak, it is significant
to note that regulation by the STB means that Amtrak is policed by the same regulator as other
public and private railroads. See also SURFACE TRANSP. BD., supra note 253.
257. Compare SURFACE TRANSP. BD., supra note 253 (explaining that STB is responsible for
economic regulation of the entire railroad industry and other transportation modes), with POSTAL
REGUL. COMM’N, supra note 256 (explaining that PRC regulates USPS). Further, the current concurrent jurisdiction of the federal courts and the STB over rail transportation shows that Congress
is perfectly willing to allow some inconsistency or play in the joints of rail regulation as it stands.
See Order at 3–4, Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reg’l Transp. Auth., 2021 WL 4318106 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
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litigating authority will impact only the passenger-preference statute—a
right that is only enjoyed by Amtrak.258 Thus, the concern about depriving the DOJ of litigation in this area in favor of Amtrak is of little force
as it relates to the necessity of a common federal litigating position.259
The common concerns260 about executive-branch control and a desire
for specialized litigators are inapposite. Amtrak is already intended to be
an entity insulated from direct political control and disciplined by the
market rather than the executive.261 Further, Amtrak does not exercise its
own regulatory control over other persons or entities.262 The concern
about specialization and skill is also misplaced here. First, Amtrak derives no benefit from the DOJ’s specialization if these skilled litigators
refuse to answer its calls.263 Second, Amtrak already uses outside counsel,
27, 2020) (No. 19-cv-7957), ECF 62 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and refusing to cede
jurisdiction over dispute regarding extent of common-carriage obligations to STB due to its own
concurrent jurisdiction); Commuter Rail Div. of the Reg’l Transp. Auth.—Pet. for Declaratory Order, Docket No. FD 36420, Dec. ID 50364 (S.T.B. Aug. 6, 2020) (holding STB proceeding corresponding to Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reg’l Transp. Auth. in abeyance due to district court’s earlier
exercise of its own jurisdiction over case). Thus, any inconsistency this could cause in the railroad
regulation landscape would likely be minimal or at least within the range already tolerated by Congress in other matters of railroad regulation.
258. See Rail Passenger Fairness Act, S. 2922, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing that Congress
codify request to provide litigating authority only for provision of Amtrak’s authorizing statute
related to passenger preference); see also 49 U.S.C. § 24308(c) (limiting passenger-preference
rights, by its terms, only to “intercity and commuter rail passenger transportation provided by or
for Amtrak”).
259. See The Attorney General’s Role, supra note 139, at 54 (stating an expression of this concern).
260. See The Attorney General’s Role, supra note 139, at 54 (stating that centralization is necessary to promote supervision of the administrative state by an elected official—the president);
Lemos, supra note 182, at 188–89 (claiming that the need for specialized litigation professionals
in federal government necessitates centralization of federal litigators in the DOJ).
261. Compare Devins, supra note 144, at 287–88 (explaining how president can use his influence over attorneys representing independent agencies to allow for some democratic accountability
in that corner of the regulatory state), with O’Connell, supra note 47, at 888–89 (explaining that
corporate form is seen as a way to shield provision of services to the public from lobbying and
political influence and promote decision-making based on free market); see also Froomkin, supra
note 46, at 578–79 (emphasizing government corporation’s ability to better-provide a service that
is commercial in nature, possibly self-sustaining, and involving regular commercial transactions
with general public).
262. See Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding
that providing Amtrak with regulatory authority over privately held railroads is a due-process violation).
263. Compare FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–8 (describing total lack of enforcement
of Amtrak’s preference rights despite host freight railroads’ flagrant violations), with Herz, supra
note 201, at 715 (claiming that agencies are advantaged by representation of highly skilled attorneys
due to specialization and centralization), and Devins & Herz, supra note 183, at 584–85 (claiming
that agencies are advantaged by specialization because they are represented by highly skilled attorneys more likely to be attracted to prestige of DOJ); cf. Babcock, supra note 170, at 185–86 (noting
complaints by agency lawyers that DOJ does not understand other agencies’ programs and needs).
In fact, Amtrak could be said to derive a loss because it would save money and be more effective
were it allowed to make its own passenger-preference enforcement decisions. See OIG REPORT,
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rather than the DOJ, for many cases.264 Third, railroad regulation is a sufficiently specialized and narrow area of law such that subject-matter expertise likely outweighs the DOJ’s trial expertise.265 Thus, the executive
control and specialization concerns are not particularly applicable in
Amtrak’s passenger-preference situation. On the whole, then, it is apparent that Amtrak would benefit from the requested passenger-preference
litigation authority and that it fits the typical circumstances in which Congress often provides that relief.266
It is clear that something needs to be done to promote the enforcement
of Amtrak’s passenger-preference rights. The DOJ has refused to enforce
the statute for nearly the entirety of its history,267 and recent steps through
the STB are insufficient and rely on an agency with significant incentives
to rule against Amtrak in any event.268 Providing Amtrak independent
litigating authority to enforce its preference rights will make the indifference of other agencies irrelevant and is particularly appropriate in this
highly specialized area of law.269 Such authority would put the situation
in the hands of the people who know what the agency and its programs
need to be successful in the more practical sense.270 Thus, providing
Amtrak with its own independent litigation authority, allowing it to enforce its passenger-preference rights on host railroad tracks, is the more
effective solution to the problem and is congruent with the ecosystem of
federal litigation authority.
supra note 59, at 2–3 (explaining that Amtrak’s abysmal on-time performance costs railroad more
than $40 million annually); see also FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–8 (explaining delays
caused by host freight railroads amidst DOJ nonenforcement).
264. See, e.g., Am. Premier Underwriters v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 709 F.3d 584, 585 (6th
Cir. 2013); see also VBR Tours, LLC v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 14-cv-00804, 2015 WL
5693735 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2015) (noting outside counsel representing Amtrak as defendant in
actions).
265. See Johnstone, supra note 116, at 268 (describing narrow, specialized nature of railroad
regulation); see also Our History, FLETCHER & SIPPEL LLC, https://www.fletcher-sippel.com/about-fletcher-sippel [https://perma.cc/4J7V-FWAV] (last visited Mar. 25, 2021) (demonstrating specialized and narrow nature of railroad regulation through its existence as a firm catering
specifically to railroad-industry clients).
266. See Laitner, supra note 7 (explaining consequences of Amtrak’s inability to enforce its
preference rights in court); compare Karr, supra note 250, at 1090–93 (explaining DOJ’s refusal to
represent FTC’s positions in court and resulting litigation authority provided by Congress as a result), with FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–4, 4 n.13 (expressing DOJ’s total failure to advocate for enforcement of Amtrak’s statutory preference rights in court despite on-time issues).
267. See FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–4, 4 n.13 (noting that court in Unted States v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co neither endorsed nor rejected DOJ’s legal interpretation of
preference statute).
268. See discussion supra Section IV.A (discussing insufficiency of current attempts to promote
passenger-preference enforcement).
269. See discussion supra Section IV.B (discussing where Amtrak passenger-preference nonenforcement situation fits within the broader context of federal litigation authority as a policy and
legal matter).
270. See Babcock, supra note 170, at 185–86 (expressing that many agencies believe DOJ does
not understand other agencies’ programs and needs as well as the agencies’ own attorneys).
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CONCLUSION
It is well known that Amtrak has on-time performance issues that mar
its reputation and the quality of its service, often making it unusable for
many.271 As America begins to emphasize transportation modes that are
more sustainable and less automobile-focused, the benefits passenger rail
can provide will be more valuable than ever.272 As a result, advocates and
government officials have taken steps to raise Amtrak’s credibility and
expand its services to take advantage of its promise.273 However, Amtrak
must improve its on-time metrics in order to become a larger part of
American transportation and increase its financial sustainability.274 Thus,
reform is needed.
Amtrak’s performance is hopelessly hobbled by its reliance on others
to enforce its preferred trackage rights.275 The DOJ has refused to enforce
these statutory rights, despite host railroad noncompliance dating back to
the late 1970s.276 Further, the STB—the most recent vehicle for passenger-preference enforcement—is inherently incentivized to favor the
health of freight railroads and interests of shippers over Amtrak’s rights
and effectiveness.277 Because enforcement is insufficient, Amtrak is continuously undercut by the railroads whose common-carrier burdens it was
created to alleviate.278 Thus, Congress needs to grant Amtrak’s request
271. See Guzman, supra note 7 (“We’ve been asked to settle for less in this country. . . .”); see
also, e.g., Laitner, supra note 7 (explaining Amtrak’s on-time performance issues and their effect
on the service’s usefulness to and credibility with the general traveling public).
272. See Irfan, supra note 4 (expressing importance of American passenger rail in the Green
New Deal); see also BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT, supra note 2 (advocating for new investment to kickstart “second great railroad revolution” to revitalize American transportation infrastructure).
273. See, e.g., BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT, supra note 2; see also Marybeth Luczak, Amtrak Playing
Hardball With CSX, NS on Gulf Coast Service (Updated), RY. AGE (Mar. 16, 2021),
https://www.railwayage.com/passenger/intercity/amtrak-playing-hardball-with-ns-csx-on-gulfcoast-service/?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=23445
[https://perma.cc/
WDX2-YYQY] (chronicling efforts of Amtrak, state and local officials, and Southern Rail Commission to restore long-abandoned passenger service through Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi).
274. See OIG REPORT, supra note 59, at 5–6, 8–14 (explaining the myriad operational benefits
from either a modest or substantial improvement in Amtrak’s on-time performance and how that
can lead to increased ridership and greater financial sustainability).
275. See generally FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16 (explaining total lack of enforcement of
Amtrak’s passenger-preference rights in context of significant non-compliance of host freight railroads).
276. See FED. R.R. ADMIN., supra note 16, at 3–4, n.13 (illustrating DOJ’s lack of passengerpreference enforcement).
277. See discussion supra Section IV.A (discussing STB’s inherent conflicts of interest when
asked to defend Amtrak’s interests against freight railroad industry and railroad shippers it is tasked
with protecting).
278. See, e.g., Luczak, supra note 273 (internal citation omitted) (“[T]hroughout this process,
[the Southern Rail Commission] has maintained that . . . service along the Gulf Coast should work
for both freight and passenger rail interests. However, CSX has failed to reciprocate this sentiment
and their actions demonstrate . . . an unwillingness to negotiate in good faith and an opposition to
bringing back passenger rail service to communities along the Gulf Coast.”).
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for independent litigating authority to enforce its passenger-preference
rights.279
Allowing Amtrak to unshackle itself in this way fits into the ecosystem
of federal litigating authority as it stands today.280 Amtrak’s status as an
independent, market-disciplined agency in a specialized legal arena counsels in favor of granting it this additional power.281 Furthermore, downsides such as decreased political control and conflicts with other government agencies seem out of place considering Amtrak’s status.282
Congress’s grants of independent litigating authority to the USPS and
FTC, among other agencies, provide persuasive precedent for allowing
such authority in Amtrak’s case.283 Thus, due to the compelling nature of
the circumstances, Congress needs to revise the legal landscape on this
issue by providing Amtrak its own right of action in the enforcement of
its passenger-preference rights.284 This will allow Amtrak’s expansion to
pick up steam and make the railroad a leader in sustainable transportation
in the United States.285

279. See GOLDMAN, supra note 24, at 16 (describing Amtrak’s repeated requests that it be given
its own enforcement or litigating authority with which to assert its passenger preference); supra
Part IV (arguing that Congress needs to grant Amtrak independent litigating authority pursuant to
its statutory passenger preference).
280. See discussion supra Section IV.B (explaining that Amtrak’s passenger-preference trouble
fits Congress’s criteria for granting independent litigating authority to federal agencies).
281. Compare Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 95–96 (1994)
(explaining that FEC has independent litigating authority to insulate it from political interference),
with O’Connell, supra note 47, at 888–89 (explaining that government corporations like Amtrak
are to be free from political interference and disciplined by free market).
282. See, e.g., The Attorney General’s Role, supra note 139, at 54 (describing need for uniform
legal positions across executive branch and presidential supervision, and role DOJ plays in those
priorities); Lemos, supra note 182, at 188 (describing skills-based advantages of having an agency
specializing in federal litigation). For the reasons discussed above, primarily an inability to regulate
others and Amtrak’s intended role as a politically independent commercial enterprise, these concerns are largely inapplicable to providing Amtrak with the narrow litigating authority it desires.
See discussion supra Section IV.B.
283. See O’Connell, supra note 143, at 921 (describing USPS’s path to independent litigating
authority); Karr, supra note 250, at 1090–93 (describing Congress’s provision of independent litigating authority to FTC due to DOJ’s unfaithful representation).
284. See, e.g., Rail Passenger Fairness Act, S. 2922, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing reform of
passenger preference by granting Amtrak’s request for an independent right of action).
285. See Hoffrichter, supra note 5 (explaining passenger rail’s sustainability advantages over
other passenger transportation modes and how other nations have taken advantage of this through
continued technological advancement).

